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INTRODUCTION
In May 1978, Soviet-supported Katangan rebels invaded the mining
province of Shaba in Zire. In December 1978 a U.S. company owned deep-
sea mining vessel, the Glomar Explorer completed its first testing of
ferromanganese nodules off the coast of California. These two seemingly
isolated events are in fact clearly related through their implications
for the future of the orld markets for some key nonfuel minerals. The
first event typifies te sort of disruption that has raised serious con-
cern in Western economies about the secure supply of minerals. The Kol-
wezi mines in Shaha are the world's leading source of cobalt and an im-
portant source of copper. The second event carries with it the promise
of an entirely new and potentially stable source of abundant supplies of
cobalt, copper and nickel.
Events such as the two described earlier will determine the evo-
lution . of the world markets for cobalt, copper and nickel. Deep ocean
mining for ferromanganese nodules will probably be the most significant
development in the latter part of the century for at least three mineral
markets. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the evolution
of the non-communist world markets for cobalt, copper and nickel following
the impact of deep ocean mining for marine ferromanganese deposits. There
are three special aspects to this resource:
(i) It is a multimineral or joint product resource con-
sisting of iron, manganese, copper, cobalt, nickel
and traces of elements such as molybdenum.
(ii) The technology to extract it in commercial quantities
is reaching fruition at precisely the time the resource
is assuming significance as a major future source of some
key nonfuel minerals.
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(iii) It is a resource whose legal status is in a state of
transition from a transnational to supranational re-
source (S-Resource).*
The impact of ocean mining is likely to result in the following
consequences:
-- The non-communist world markets for cobalt, copper and nickel
may become very closely linked so that decisions will have to be
made in all three markets simultaneously. This means that the
variables for investment, production, pricing and marketing will
require a simultaneous solution in three markets.
-- The prices of cobalt, copper and nickel may converge. Specifi-
cally, the price of cobalt may be driven to the marginal cost
of production from offshore mining and the rice of copper may
rise above historical levels while the price of nickel stays
fairly close to an historical average.
-- Offshore mining may, under certain assumptions, capture signi-
ficant shares of the world markets for the minerals. Indeed,
the entire non-communist market for cobalt, from about 25 to
60% of the r-arket for nickel and about 20% of the market for
copper may be satisfied by offshore mining.
In evaluating the impact of ocean mining the following methodo-
logical approach was adopted: the general situation is that a certain
resource occurs with a certain global distribution, a fraction of which
is supranational or the common property of all nations. The rest of the
resource is appropriated by various nations. The supranational fraction
of the resource is currently not being exploited.
It is assumed that there are two types of nations in the world,
those that are net consumers (NC) of the given resource, i.e. that group
of nations which consume more than they produce and those that are net
producers (NP), i.e., that group of nations which produce more of the
* A transnational resource is the property of no nation. A supranational
resource is the common property of all nations. By international agree-
ment or implicit consensus among countries, no national interest or limi-
ted coalition of national interests can appropriate an S-Resource.
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resource than they consume. The NC wish to initiate exploitation of the
supranational resource (S-Resource) for reasons which include a desire to
capture some of the rents of production and secure access to a poten-
tially stable, politically neutral source of supply. The NP wish to
prevent exploitation o the S-Resource for fear of losing revenue, mar-
ket share or political power. The NC possess the technology to develop
the S-Resource, while he NP do not.
The two major que'tions facing these two groups of nations are:
(1) How can the rent derived from the production of the S-
Resource be divided between the NC and the NP in a manner
that minimizes conflict so that resource development can
proceed, and
(2) What are the levels of production, price and technological
royalties that accompany the distribution of rent?
Since the desire to minimize conflict is a given in the situation the
structural changes necessary in world markets to accommodate the develop-
ment of the S-Resource can only be brought about through a process of bar-
gaining between the NP and the NC. This bargaining is modeled through the
use of a Nash two part cooperative game to determine the unique pareto-
optimal distribution of rent and the values of the price, quantity, royalty
and market share variables that determine the magnitudes of rent accruing
to the NP and NC.
This report is divided into four chapters. These are:
Chapter 1: Deep Seabed Mining Issues
Chapter 2: Game Model Formulation
Chapter 3: Demand Curves and Production Costs
Chapter 4: Model Results and Conclusions.
* Rents are defined to mean the difference between price and long run
marginal cost of production. They include rents to ability, pure
and quasi-rents.
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CHAPTER 1: DEEP SEABED MINING ISSUES
Ferromanganese nodules are but one of several (implicit) S-Resources
that have begun to attract the attention of planners in both corporations
and governments. The interest in ocean minerals is the most visible mani-
festation of a general interest in all S-Resources. While there are similar
issues involved in exploiting all S-Resources, they have been articulated in
great detail only for ferromanganese nodules largely because of the publicity
associated with the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS
III). In the sections that follow the reason for the interest in S-Resources
will first be outlined and then the issues with deep ocean mining will be
summarized.
The Interest in Supranational Resources
The S-Resources currently of interest are the minerals of the deep
ocean bed, Antarctiica,space, moon and other celestial bodies. Recent de-
bate over the availability of resources for consumption in the future seems
curiously inhibited by the notion of static resource reserve levels and has
largely ignored the potential of S-Resources. These can significantly raise
the levels of available minerals, energy and food.
The fresh water protein and fuel potential of the Antarctic, for in-
stance, remain completely unexploited; the use of solar power satellites
for energy generation has just begun to attract attention; systematic dev-
elopment of the mineral resources of the deep oceans has barely started;
extra-terrestrial mining, near-earth space industrialization and coloni-
zation are proposals that have only in recent years become the serious con-
cerns of scientists, economists and planners.
* The preponderance of the planet's fresh water resources are locked in
the Antarctic.
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The real concern about exhaustible resources is not that they will
one day physically disappear, but that extraction costs of present re-
serves will rise until they become prohibitive. Accompanying this in-
crease in extraction csts will be an increase in scarcity rent. The
scarcity rent or royalty component of price will rise exponentially either
as the rate of interes; (Hotelling, 1931) or, if the economy is overcon-
suming, as some weight-d average of the market and consumption rates of
interest (Hanson, 1977). The total increase in price will be the sum of
the increases in marginal extraction cost and scarcity rent. The increase
in real price will cause a decrease in demand through a search for substi-
tutes while an increase in scarcity rent will result in an increase in re-
serves as indicated by the rent elasticity of reserves and an interest in
exploiting new sources of a resource that become increasingly attractive
as the rent increases. S-Resources could easily fall into the category
of completely new sources.
Moreover, new resource stocks may become commercially attractive be-
cause of technological evolution which can either provide access to hitherto
physically unattainable stocks or can act to countervail rising extraction
costs. It does not seem unreasonable to expect that the application of ex-
isting and evolving technology to S-Resources can make available vast new
stocks.
The economics of resource depletion is but one reason for the growing
interest in S-Resources. The others are the politics of international power
centers, the development of technologies that might render the S-Resources
capable of national appropriation and exploitation, the threat of militari-
zation of the ocean bed and space, the desire among the members of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to develop
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potentially neutral and stable sources of supply and the fear among the
countries of the Group of 77 that they might be excluded from any income
that could flow from the commercial development of S-Resources as indus-
trialized nations use their financial and technological strength to under-
take the economic colonization of what has been designated the "common
heritage of mankind." Moreover, the growing interest of several multi-
national corporations in S-Resources has excited the suspicions of some
who believe that these organizations are determined to bring within their
profit maximizing ambit the common property of all humanity, and hence
develop them in a socially non-optimal manner.
The deep ocean-bed, an S-Resource that has generated the most in-
terest, illustrates the concerns just cited. The issues pertaining to
the deep ocean bed are discussed next.
Issues Involved in Deep Seabed MIinin
The military potential of the deep ocean-bed has certainly not es-
caped the attention of writers on naval warfare. Had it not been prevented
by international agreement, then by 1990 there could have been nuclear mis-
siles emplaced on the ocean-bed, permanent observation posts established,
anti-submarine bases constructed and manned torpedo batteries for use a-
gainst surface shipping devised (Luard, 1974) . The occupation of
the seabed for securing military advantage was actively discussed during
the sixties, leading to visions of military confrontation between the super-
powers in yet another arena (Luard, 1974) . This was particularly
objectionable because it would involve the subversion of the commonly owned
property of all nations to the strategic aims of two military rivals.
* These firms are the most likely repositories of the capital, management
and technology required to develop S-Resources.
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In the area of economic militancy the increasing attempts by pro-
ducers of raw materials to cartelize world markets for primary goods and
the growing dependence of many consumer nations, in particular the United
States, Japan and those of Western Europe, on imported oil and minerals
have created a desire among many nations of the First World to develop
secure and stable sour.es of supply. It is reasoned that if the sources
of supply could be int rnalized within the industrialized world economic system or
if they could be rende ed politically neutral, then the hazards of inter-
dependence with the Third World could be mitigated. Deep ocean mining can
yield, initially, manganese, cobalt, nickel and copper. Cobalit is a cri-
tical strategic mineral and manganese is vital for the steel industry.
The very threat of new entry through ocean mining, it has been suggested
(Amacher and Sweeney, 1976), could effectively discourage the formation
of mineral cartels. The copper cartel, which is just beginning to dis-
cover cohesion, would be severely undermined and the monopoly pricing
tactics of Zaire and Zambia with respect to cobalt would be rendered
very difficult by the development of deep ocean-bed minerals.
The countries of the Group of 77 view the prospects of deep ocean
mining with both alarm and excited anticipation. For a very small num-
ber of nations that are exporters of cobalt, nickel, copper and manganese,
there is the very real prospect of losing market share and export revenues
(Wasserman, 1975). The majority of Third World countries, however, con-
ceives of the deep ocean-bed as a cornucopia of mineral wealth. Articles
in the popular press (see, for example, Anderson, 1973; and
Wertenbaker, 1977) and some early estimates of available minerals published
by researchers extrapolated from very limited data (Wright, 1976)
have created the illusion of easy riches which many nations of the Third
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World fell should accrue to them as a form of rent from a commonly owned
resource.
The first call for formalizing the status of the deep seabed as an
S-Resource was made on November 1, 1967 by the Maltese delegate to the
U.N., Dr. Arvid Pardo, who presented, in eloquent detail, the economic,
environmental, militar. and legal interests involved in the oceans and
deep seabed. The inte national response to Dr. Pardo's speech was swift
and acrimonious. Almo t immediately, the nations of the world found them-
selves divided and some of those dissensions have yet to be resolved. The
Communist states expressed their aversion to establishing a U.N. authority,
the Western nations advocated caution and the Latin American countries too
warned against any hasty action lest it prejudice any of their extensive
claims of territorial seas and continental shelves. Malta, a number of
developing countries and Sweden, however, sensed the urgency in declaring
the deep ocean-bed an S-Resource (Luard, 1974). At their in-
sistence the U.N. General established an ad hoc committee to study the
issue in March of 1968. The work of this committee led to UNCLOS III,
whose various conventions have so far failed to produce a treaty.
The technology for developing the deep seabed minerals is the exclusive
province of a number of private multinational consortia comprised of cor-
porations domiciled in the U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, W. Germany and Japan.
* M.A. Ajomo does not use the word rent but implies much the same thing when
he writes "In other words all states will have a joint interest in the re-
sources of the ocean floor which will entitle them to benefits in the pro-
ceeds of exploration even though, in the case of countries of the Third
World, they may not be able to contribute pro rata to the costs of explor-
ation and exploitation." "Third World Expectations" in New Directions in
the Law of the Sea, Collected Papers - Volume III, ed., Robin Churchil,
K.R. Simmonds and Jane Welch, Oceana Publications (Dobbs Ferry, New York:
1973), pp. 307-308.
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While mining techniques are fairly well advanced and commercial mining
could begin by 1985, the multinational consortia are reluctant to commit
large sums to development until the operative rules for the deep ocean
have been clarified. IUNCLOS III has struggled for several years to de-
fine a commercial code for the deep seabed minerals but the traditional
suspicions of multinat onal corporations that many delegates from the
Third World harbor, ha e precluded any final agreement. The multinational
corporations, as usual have been limned as voracious entities poised to
appropriate for their very private gain the common property of mankind,
prevented from doing so only by the ideological alertness of the United
Nations. Economic and technological uncertainties, complex enough in the
case of nationally appropriate resources, are compounded by legal lacunae
in the matter of S-Resources.
It needs to be pointed out that the deep seabed is only a part of the
general debate over the oceans. This study does not attempt to focus on all
aspects of that debate but rather on those portions of it which pertain to
the economic. determinants of deep oceanbed minerals development. While the
political issues have been extensively discussed by various commentators,
the economic question of rent distribution within an international bar-
gaining context has not been explicitly treated. Perhaps politics will
eventually dominate economics in the management of the deep oceanbed, but
it is hoped, nonetheless, that an investigation of the economics will provide
the outlines of a solution within which the political and institutional ques-
tions can be formulated and resolved.
The general debate, does, however, provide a frame of reference for a
discussion on deep oceanbed minerals. With reference to deep oceanbed
-- See, for example, the Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute,
various years.
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minerals the main economic and political components are:
1. The freedom of the major maritime powers to conduct scientific
investigations and carry out naval reconaissance and patrols.
2. The unilateral appropriation of the deep oceans by the major
powers.
3. The compulsory transfer of ocean mining technology from the
nations of the North to the countries of the South.
4. Quotas on the production of minerals from marine ferroman-
ganese deposits to protect the interests of existing net
producers, often from the South.
5. Access, largely by the nations of the orth to potentially
stable sources of important minerals such as copper, cobalt
and nickel.
6. The decline of military nwer as a paramleter in the settlement
of international disputes and the concomlnriitant rise of economic
power (in the orm of control over oil and nonfuel minerals) as
a source of leverage.
7. The distribution of the benefits from marine minerals develop-
ment (beyond the 200 mile economic zone) within the general
framework of th e ew ,.conomic ,rder, entailing a net transfer
of resources from the North to the South.
8. The development of manganese nodules through private capital
supplied by international mining consortia drawn from Western
Europe, Japan and North Anerica or through international public
capital controlled by a transnational seabed regime dominated
by the Group of 77 and initially funded by the nations of the
North and perhaps the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
9. The integration of deep seabed minerals production with a general
scheme for commodity price stabilization and international commo-
dity agreements involving producers and consumers.
The issues listed above have to be resolved within the context of
international law. The codification of a body of international law for
the oceans is proving a monumental task not just because of the complexity
of the political questions like delimitation, sovereignty, jurisdiction and
enforcement but also because rules governing the economic development of
the S-Resources portion of the ocean, the deepsea floor, have to be an inte-
gral part of a Law of the Sea.
The legal issues have been divided into over 300 separate articles as
embodied in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the seventh session
of UNCLOS III and agreement has been reached on most issues. The most
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significant issue of all, however, the economic development of the deep
oceanbed, has eluded a consensus.
The following matters appear largely settled:
1. Territorial seas will extend up to 12 miles from the coast and
with this bouniary coastal nations will have complete sovereignty
except where limited by international rules of navigation.
2. In straits th; are narrower than 24 miles, foreign ships will
have almost ur-estricted rights of innocent passage on or in
international ;ea lanes.
3. Coastal natior; will have economic zones that extend from the
12 mile natiorl limit to 200 miles from the coast. Within the
188 mile econc-iic zone, each coastal state will exercise sover-
eignty over the mineral and living resources, except for migra-
tory species of fish.
4. The area beyond the 200 mile limit will be international and
the resources will be S-Resources.
The following matters have yet to be settled:
1. The rules and institutions that will govern the exploitation of
the minerals of the deep oceans.
2. The extent of international prerogatives in enforcing rules on
conserving living resources and preventing pollution of the
oceans.
3. The priority between coastal and navigational interests when
they come into conflict in straits, territorial seas and
economic zones.
* For details see Office of the Law of the Sea Negotiations, U.S.
Department of State, Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, "Informal Single Negotiating Text and Text on Settle-
ment of Disputes," A/Conf.62/WP.8/Pts. I,II,III, May 7, 1975.
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CHAPTER 2: GAME MODEL FORMULATION
Analysis of the deep oceanbed minerals has either focused on
building financial models of hypothetical mining ventures using prices
as an exogenous vector (ADL, 1977) or have concentrated on constructing
econometric models of vrious minerals markets and using offshore pro-
duction as an exogenous variable (Adams, 1975) . The bargaining as-
pect of the problem ha, usually been abstracted away. The matter of rent
distribution needs to e settled in the context of a negotiated outcome
between the NP and NC. At the least such an outcome would simultaneously
determine world prices and production and have as its basis the relative
economic and political bargaining strengths of the actors. The economic
strength is assumed to be a function of marginal costs which determine
limit prices and consequently,market share,in a price dispute and the
political strength is assumed to be a complex, non-quantifiable function
of international interdependence and the quest for international egali-
tarianism. While the combined economic and political bargaining process
is not amenable to modeling, the economic aspects by themselves can be
rigorously formulated and in investigating the economics some bounds can
be established within which a political bargain can be reached. While
the economic analysis will not, by itself, provide the solutions, it
can help to focus attention to a feasible region within which political
debate can be conducted usefully.
To reiterate, the basic economic issues are:
1. How should the rent of production from the deep oceanbed be
divided between the NP and the NC in a manner that minimizes
conflict, and
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2. What will be the prices, production levels, technological
royalties and offshore markets shares for cobalt, copper
and nickel once commercial ocean mining starts.
In arriving at a solution to the bargaining situation between the
NP and the NC the following assumptions will be made:
-- Utility of the NP and NC is a function of rent and the NP
and NC maximiz: rent, and in some cases consumer surplus.
-- The NP and NC :re explicitly bound by treaty not to develop
the S-Resource without mutual consent.
-- The technology for developing the S-Resource resides only with
the NC. It is the availability of technology that confers
value on the S-Resource and provides the NC with bargaining
strength, thus initiating the game.
-- The cost of developing the S-Resource is not equal to the
cost of developing the nationally appropriated resource.
Orthodox economic theory is unable to predict the forms on which
agreements might be reached in general situations where settlements must
be arrived at by means of explicit or implicit bargainings. All that
orthodox economic theory offers is that agreement tends to fall within
some range of practicable solutions. Attempts to secure a more precisely
defined solution have been made by Hicks (1932), Zeuthen (1930) and Nash
(1950, 1953). Nash's theory appears to offer the best framework for sol-
ving the bargaining problem regarding ferromanganese nodules.
An important advance made by Nash was the clear distinction between
bargaining situations that do and those that do not allow parties a choice
among alternative threats by which to bring pressure upon each other. Bar-
gaining situations with one possible threat by each party occur in two
cases:
(i) When the two parties can achieve a certain gain by cooper-
ation but when either can threaten to withhold cooperation
unless a certain and satisfactory sharing agreement is reached.
(ii) When one or both parties are able to inflict one particular
sort of positive damage on the other and use this possibility
as a threat.
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In both cases agreement means saving the costs of a conflict and
this saving can be divided between the two parties.
The bargaining problem has an evident solution in the special case
when the situations are completely symmetrical with respect to the two
bargaining parties. In this case it seems reasonable to assume that the
two actors will share the net gain equally, since neither would be pre-
pared to grant the other better terms than the latter would bestow.
Nash's theory of bargaining (with given threats) is essentially
a generalization of this principle for the general case of asymmetric
situations. Nash's conclusion is that if the utilities of the two ac-
tors are measured by von Neumann-Morganstern cardinal utility indices,
they will reach an agreement at that point within the range of practi-
cable solutions where the product of the utilities each actor ascribes
to the net gain (above the conflict situation) is maximized.
Zeuthen also approached the problem of two party bargaining and
arrived at a solution mathematically equivalent to that of Nash.
Zeuthen's approach is based on a direct analysis of collective bar-
gaining in the labor market but it has general validity for any sort
of bargaining situation.
Hicks also sought a solution to the two party bargaining problem
by considering collective bargaining in the labor market. Hicks' theory
is summarized by Harsanyi (1956) as follows:
"Each bargaining party will make a concession if, in
his view, the strike resulting from his refusing this
concession would cost him more than the concession
would. (Of course, costs must be reckoned at their
present values to make significant comparison possi-
ble.) The higher a given wage rate the more its ac-
ceptance will cost the employer and the longer the
strike he will be prepared to endure rather than to
accept this wage rate. Thus each wage rate will be
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associated in the employer's mind with a strike of
given length (with one which would be just as ex-
pensive as accepting this wage rate), higher wage
rates being associated with longer strikes. On the
other hand, the lower a given wage rate the more
its acceptance will cost the trade union (in terms
of disutility) and the longer the strike they will
be prepared to undertake rather than to accept this
wage rate. Thus each wage rate will be connected
in the trade unionists' minds with a strike of a
given length (one which would be just as bad as
accepting t wage rate), but in this case lower
wage rates v1ll be connected with longer strikes.
There will tL a unique wage rate that both parties
associate with a strike of the same length: this
is the highest wage rate that the union can exact
from the employer. The latter in effect will not
accept a wage rate higher than this one since he
knows that his refusal can at worst result only
in a strike short enough to cost him less than
accepting this wage rate would. On the other
hand, for opposite reasons he will certainly be
prepared to accept this particular wage rate or,
of course, any lower one."
Hicks thus assumes that either party will choose or threaten to
choose a strike in preference to a concession only if the strike costs
less than the concession. Nash's theory differs in that, according to
the theory, each actor is ready to pressure the other by threatening
a strike whose actual occurrence, if no agreement can be reached, would
in part cost the threatening party more than a concession would, pro-
vided the threat is likely to secure better terms from the other actor
if agreement succeeds. Nash's assumption is clearly the more reasonable
one. Bargainers do use threats of retaliation that would, if enacted,
entail losses for themselves no less than for their opponents. It ap-
pears rational for them to do this since they can thus attain better
terms.
The model formulated below, therefore, relies upon the Nash two-
person cooperative game. The general idea of a game, as the term is
used here, consists of a sequence of moves to arrive at a conclusion
-1 6-
called a payoff function.
An essential feature of the cooperative game is that binding con-
tracts can be made and utility transferred from one actor to another,
though this transfer need not be linear. The utility functions R1 and
R2 , of the two actors can be mapped onto two dimensional Euclidean space.
The solution to the game is one that yields a point in the set M that
satisfies both actors. Within M there is a subset, S, called the fea-
sible set such that given any (R1, R2) cS, it is possible for the two
actors, in concert, to obtain the utilities Rl and R2 respectively.
The minimum acceptable payoff is what either could obtain by unilateral
action, irrespective of what the other does. This payoff is termed the
maximin value of the game for an actor because it is the greatest mini-
mum he/she can obtain by acting alone. If the payoffs are denoted by
o o
R1 and R2, then the bargaining game seeks a rule such that a triple
(S, R1 , R2) has a solution:
0 (S, R1 , R2) = (R 1 , R2)
A measure of the bargaining power of the two actors is clearly
needed and it was to address this problem that Nash introduced the con-
cept of a threat point which is the outcome that would result if nego-
tiations failed and non-cooperation ensued. The threat point is the
solution to a Nash non-cooperative game and is the minimum payoff either
actor would accept in the event of non-cooperation. There is no rational
reason for either player to accept less.
-1 7-
et - or pareto frontier
Nash Solution
I . I__ _._ .i 
, L & I
Threat} oint
Nash's premise is that actors enter into a bargaining game because
they expect to attain payoffs larger than those given by the threat
point. The actors perceive incremental gains accruing from cooperation
and proceed to divide these gains in a manner directly proportional to
the losses that might be sustained if negotiations broke down. The rela-
tive bargaining power of either actor is, therefore, a function of his/
her ability to inflict losses on the other.
Nash proceeded to solve the game by first postulating a set of six
axioms and then demonstrating that the axioms were uniquely satisfied by
a point on the bargaining set. This point, according to the axioms, is
pareto-optimal and is given by maximizing the product of (R2 - R2) and
(R - R1 ).
The six axioms of John Nash are:
Al: The actors are rational.
* *0
(R1, R2) > (R1, R )
A2: The solution is feasible.
(R1, R2) S
- -
- · II -
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A3: The solution is pareto-optimal.
If (R1, R2) e S, and (R1, R2) > (R1, R2) then
(R1, R2) = (Rl, R2)
A4: The solution is independent of irrelevant alternatives.
3r * * * o
If (R1, R2) Se ' and (R1, R2) = (S, R 1, R2), then
· J 
(Rl , R2 ) = '(S5 R1 , R2)
This implies thai the feasible set is enlarged from S to S the
solution to the new p blem will be either (R1, R2) itself or a new
point in the bigger set S, not a point in the old set S.
A5: The solution is independent of linear transformations.
R1 = a1 R1 + bl
R2 = a2 R2 + b2
Then if (S, R1, R2) (R1, R2) it must be that (S, alR 1 + bl,
a2R2 + b2) = (alR 1 + b1, a2R2 + b2)
A6: The solution is symmetrical. Suppose S is such that
(R1, R2) S <-> (R2, R1) S,
o o o o * I
Suppose also R1 = R2 and )(S, R1, R2) = (R1, R2) then
* *
R1 = R 2.
THE GAME MODEL
A bewildering variety of institutional arrangements have been pro-
posed to deal with the question of how the development of ferromanganese
nodules should proceed. At one end of a spectrum are rather simple
schemes where an attempt would be made to determine some level of out-
put from offshore mining and the world price of the products. A rather
more complicated scheme would envision the NC (or the mining consortia
within the NC) transferring their technology to the NP so that current
-19-
onshore producers would have the option to mine the deep seabed.
A rather more involved version of the previous scheme would have
not only the NC transferring technology but also paying some form of
production royalties (n offshore mining) to the NP. Variants of these
three schemes have been discussed for several years by delegates from
148 countries at UNCLC; III since 1968.
In an attempt to iodel the essential economic elements of the
various institutional -chemes that have been propounded, the game
developed in this section will be played under three basic scenarios.
The first scenario is one in which only the NC develop the ocean min-
erals and the policy variables are price and world demand share of
either actor. In the second scenario the NC, which are assumed to
possess the technology for developing the ferromanganese nodules, li-
cense it to the NP at a royalty rate which is a function of. the price and
only the NP produce. In this scenario world demand is met from nation-
ally appropriated onshore mines and deep-oceanbed mines and the policy
variables are the output share of offshore production, the price and
the technology licensing royalty.
In the third scenario, the NC license technology to the NP, the NP
charge the NC a production royalty which is a function of price and both
produce. The policy variables are price, demand share of NP and NC, out-
put share of offshore production, technology and production royalties.
The quantification of the game model is next discussed. For pur-
poses of exposition the model is first developed with a static formu-
lation where ocean minerals are considered a single resource. A dy-
namic version of the model is next presented. Finally, a static joint
product model for scenario 1 is developed to illustrate how the basic
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game model can be extended to incorporate the coproduct aspect of the pro-
blem. The discussion starts with an analysis of the static symmetrical case.
Model Specification
P = world price of the resource
D(P) = D = net world demand for the resource, i.e. the foreign demand facing
the NP
D(P) = AP-b (isoelasti( demand curve), where A and b are constants; b is
the price elasticity of net demand, or, alternatively,
D(P) = a-bP (linear dei ind curve)
RNp = rent accruing to the NP
RO = threat point of the NPNP
RNC = rent accruing to the NC
RC = threat point of the NCNC
CS = cost of producing one unit of the S-Resource
Cp = cost of producing one unit of the nationally appropriated resource,
i.e. the cost to the NP
The Symmetrical Case
The complexities of the economic bargaining problem owe their origins
to the different cost curves facing the NP and NC and the different threat
points for either. If both faced the same costs and the threat points
were identical then the solution would be trivial. The problem would be
reduced to that of a two member cartel which sets a monopoly price and
divides the rent equally. This is demonstrated below using a linear de-
mand curve (D = a-bP).
The Nash Solution is obtained by:
Max R = (RNp - R RC)
P,B
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o 0
where B = fraction of world demand met by NP. Since RNp = RNC, a
suitable choice of axes can set both equal to zero. Further, C = Cp =
C = cost of producing one unit of the resource.
So that, Max R = RNPRNC
P,B
= [(P-C)BD] [(P-C) (1-B)D]
= (P-C)2 D2 B(1-B)
aR = [2 (P-C)D 2 + D (p_C)2] B (-B)
aP2+ dP B (-B)
=0
dD= -b; substituting in the equation above leads to
2 D+C
0 = 2(P-C) D2- 2(P-C) Db or P = b
Substituting for D
a + bC
2b
aR o = (P-C) 2D2 (1-2B) or B 
The Nash Solution states that the NP and NC divide the world demand
market equally at a price, P =a + bC2b
If there were a monopolist in control of the resource, then that rent
would be
R = (P-C) (a-bP)
-_bp2 + P(bC + a) - aC
Maximizing rent:
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dR= = -2Pb + bC + adP
so that P = a + bC2b
Thus, the monopoly solution is the same as the Nash Solution.
The Static Model
Scenario 1: Both NP and NC produce; no transfer payments
The NC can, of course, produce only from the S-Resource and the NP
from only the nationally appropriated resource since they do not possess
the technology to develop the S-Resource. Both can produce as much as
they choose.
The objective function of the NP is:
RNp = (P-Cp)BD
O< B <1
where B = fraction of world demand met by NP.
The objective function of the NC is:
RNC = (P - CS)(l - B)D
The policy variables in this scenario are P and B. The game solution is
obtained by maximizing the following function:
0 0
Max R = (RNP - RNP) (RNC - RNC)
P,B
Scenario 2: Only NP produce, transfer payment from NP to NC
In this scenario, the NC license their technology to the NP and
only the NP produce. It is equivalent to the NC also producing and
transferring the rent to the NP after deducting a technology royalty.
The royalty on technology, Q, is considered to be a fraction of the
price P.
The objective function of the NP is:
RNP = (P-Cp)(l-y)D + (P(1-Q)-C S) yD
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where y = output share of S-Resources.
The objective function of the NC is:
RNC = QyD
The policy variables are P, Q, y. The game solution is obtained by
solving:
Max R =(R PRNp(RN-R)(R NRN)
P,Q,¥
Scenario 3: Both NP and NC produce; transfer payments
In this scenario, both the NP and NC produce; the NC license tech-
nology to the NP and the NP charge the NC a production royalty, Z (which
is considered a fraction of price, P) for producing from the S-Resources.
The objective function of the NP is:
RN = (P-Cp) (1-y)D + (P (1-Q) - CS)yOD + PZ (1-O)D
0 < Z < 1
where, y = output share of S-Resources
= production share of S-Resources allocated to the NP.
The objective function of the NC is:
RNC (P(1-Z) - CS)(1-O)yD
+.PQOyD
The policy variables are P, Q, Z, y,O.
The game solution is obtained by solving:
oa0 0
Max R (RNp-RNp)(RNC-RNC)
P,Q,Z,E),y
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The Dynamic Model
Scenario 1: Both NP and NC produce; no transfer payments
Since the resource is depletable, costs will be a function of re-
serves in each time period and the rent will be the discounted sum of
revenues over the time horizon, T.
If the reserves c the nationally appropriated resource at time t - 1
are F 1 and those of he S-Resource are
FS l then at time t,
t 1 - B t Dt
F F 1 - (1 - Bt)Dt
where Dt = Dt(Pt) = (a - b Pt)(l+g)t (using a linear demand curve)
where g = annual rate of growth of demand.
The cost of producing from nationally appropriated resources at time t
W1is p P where W1 is a constant equal to the production cost of the initial
time multiplied by the reserves at that time. Production costs rise hyperboli-
cally as reserves are depleted and this specification captures that phenomenon.
* The model formulation in this section is a development of techniques pro-
posed by Jacques Cremer and Martin L. Weitzman, "OPEC and the Monopoly Price
of World Oil," World Oil Project Working Paper No. MIT-EL-76-015WP, Energy
Laboratory, MIT (Cambridge: April 1976) and Esteban Hnyilicza and Robert
S. Pindyck, "Pricing Policies for a Two-Part Exhaustible Resources Cartel,"
European Economic Review,8,(1976),pp.139-154.
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W
The cost of producing from the S-Resource at time t, is S where W2
F
is a constant.
The objective function of the NP is:
T
RNP 61t [Pt -P ] BtDt dt
O Ft
where 61 = discount rate for the NP.
The objective function of the NC is:
T
RNC = | e-62t [Pt - 2 ] (l-Bt)Dt dt
O t
where 62 = discount rate for the NC. The game is solved in the usual man-
ner and like the two scenarios following, has the characteristics of a
problem in optimal control. The policy variables are Pt. Bt.
Scenario 2: Only the NP produce; transfer payment from NP to NC
Following the logic indicated above,
FP = FP_1 - (-yt)Dt
F5 FS FFt -I - YtDt
where t = output share of the S-Resource. The objective function of the NP is:
Max RNp = e1 (Pt ) (1 - yt)Dt + (Pt(l-Q) - -5)ytD t] dt
PtYt¥Q N t .F Ft
and the objective function of the NC is:
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Max RN62 [PtQ + D)]dt
PtYt Q NC
The policy variables are Pt, t, Q.
The game is solved in he usual manner.
Scenario 3: Both NP aid NC produce; transfer payments
The objective functior of the NP is:
RN e-62 [(Pt )(l-t)Dt + (Pt(l-Q) .F )tBtDt + PtZ(1-Bt)ytDt]dt
where F= FP - (1yt)Dt
FS = FSS t-l - YtDt
The objective function of the NC is:
T W 2
RNC = e 2 [(Pt(l-Z) 5F )(l-B tDt PtYtBtDt]dt
* t
The policy variables are Pt, Q, Z, t, Bt. The game is solved in the
usual manner.
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The discussion so far has related to a single product resource. In
order to develop a more realistic formulation of the ocean mining problem
the model is extended to a joint product resource in the next section.
Since the extension i rather direct only a static version of scenario 1
is presented. Other scenarios can be developed in a similar fashion and
are indeed explored i some detail in Chapter 4.
The Bargaining Model for a Joint Product Resource
The ferromanganese deposits on the oceanbed can be considered as
a resource that is a joint product of cobalt, nickel, copper and man-
ganese. The greatest commercial interest is in extracting cobalt and
nickel, with some interest in copper and very little in manganese. In-
deed, ocean mining has often been characterized as a nickel winning oper-
ation. U.S. Steel Corporation has expressed some concern about securing
long term supplies of manganese from onshore mines and is of the view
that around the turn of the century, ocean minerals might be a source of
manganese for the steel industry. However, the first generation of ocean
mining ventures will probably not extract manganese owing to its low price,
high marginal costs and relative abundance on land with little likelihood
of a producer's cartel in the foreseeable future.
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The Net Producers (NP) as before are those nations that produce more
than they consume. The Net Consumers (NC) are those countries that consume
more than they produce. The NC expect to secure some of the rents of pro-
duction by exploiting marine ferromanganese deposits through the various
ocean mining consortia that have been formed.
Let
P1 = world price of cobalt
P2 = world price of nickel
P3 = world price of copper
CP = marginal cost of production of NP for cobalt
CCl = marginal cost of production of ocean-based cobalt
CP2 = marginal cost of production of NP for nickel
CC2 = marginal cost of production of ocean-based nickel
CP3 = marginal cost of production of NP for copper
CC3 = marginal cost of production of ocean-based copper
RNC 9 rents of the NC
RNp = rents of the NP
RC = threat point of the NCNC
RP = threat point of the NPNP
D(P1) = net demand for cobalt
D(P2) = net demand for nickel
D(P3) = net demand for copper
Scenario 1:
In this
minerals and
Both NP and NC produce; no transfer payments
scenario, the game consists of P1, P2, P3, world prices for
B1, B2, B3, the world market shares of the NP.
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RNC = (P1 - Ccl) D (P1) (-B l) + (P2-CC2) D (P2) (1-B2) +
(P3-Cc3) D (P3) (1-B3)
RN = (P1 - Cpl) D (P1) B1 + (P2 - Cp2) D (P2) B2 + (P3 - Cp3) D (P3) B3
The objective function of the game is:
Rp (Ccl - Cpl) (Ccl) + (Cc2 - Cp2) D (Cc2) + (Cc3
ROC = 
O < B1i, B2 B3 1
- Cp3) D (Cc3)
MaxR = (RNp - ROp) (RNC - RC)
Pi' P2' P3' B1I B2' B3
The policy variables are P1, P2, P3 and B1, B2, B3.
The demand curves and production costs necessary to simulate the model
are derived in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: DEMAND CURVES AND PRODUCTION COSTS
The implementation of the game model requires the specification
of demand curves and data on production costs from onshore and offshore
mining. In the section below the demand curves facing the NP for cobalt,
nickel and copper are first formulated. Offshore and onshore production
costs for the three minerals are next presented.
NET DEMAND CURVES FOR COBALT, NICKEL AND COPPER
The Demand Curve Facing the NP for Cobalt
In terms of mined output, the major non-communist bloc producers of
cobalt in 1975 were Zaire (53%), Zambia (9%), Australia (7%), Morocco (6%),
and New Caledonia (6%). In 1975, the major producers of the metal in terms
of refined output were Zaire (65%), Zambia (9%), Norway (4%), Canada (4%),
and Finland (4%). Belgium is another major producer of the refined metal
but does not publish statistics on output. (Sibley, 1977). Zaire
exports its output chiefly to Belgium and the U.S., Zambia exports mainly
to the U.K., Japan, and the U.S., and Morocco exports to France and the
People's Republic of China. Botswana exports its ore to the U.S. for re-
fining, the Philippines exports its ore to Japan for refining and some
Australian ore is sent to Canada for refining.
The United States is the most important consumer of cobalt, and U.S.
demand accounts for about one-third of the non-communist production of the
resource. A source of supply for domestic users is the General Services
Administration (GSA) which periodically releases cobalt from its strategic
stockpile. The GSA has a three year supply on hand. The principal sources
of supply for the U.S. in 1976 were Zaire (41%), Belgium (15%), Zambia (11%),
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Norway (7%), and Botswana (6%) (Sibley, 1977, p. 9).
Econometric analysis of the world cobalt market (CRA* 1976, Burrows,
1971) indicates that the industry has the characteristics of a monopolist
with a competitive fringe. Zaire, the chief supplier, acts as the price
setter. It selects a point on the net average revenue curve such that it
maximizes profit. Alternatively, these studies suggest, Zaire maximizes
foreign exchange earnings rather than total profit, but this policy would
not move it far from the monopoly point. The competitive fringe, of course,
acts as price takers and is mostly composed of Canada, Australia, Finland,
Morocco, Zambia, Botswana, Norway and New Caledonia. The African producers
of cobalt accounted for 74% of the refined output in 1976 and a cartel with
Zaire as its core would be easy to form.
The price elasticity of demand for cobalt has been estimated at -1.7
while the elasticity of net demand facing Zaire, the price setter (the
world price of cobalt is set by Societe Zairaise de Commercialization
(SOZACOM), the marketing subsidiary of GECAMINES of Zaire), has been cal-
culated at -2.55 (* Charles River Associates (CRA), 1976).
The elasticity estimates were based on a price range from $12.2/Kg to
$7.9/Kg ( in 1975 dollars ) and conducted over a 20-year time series, from
1953 to 1973. This elasticity will be used to derive a simplified demand
equation for cobalt for use in the game model.
Assume that the demand curve is of the form,
D = A p-byC (3.1)
where
D = demand
A, b, c = constants
P = real price
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Y = index of industrial production
By normalizing Y in 1975, i.e., setting Y equal to 1, equation 3.1
reduces to
D = A pb (3.2)
In 1975, the demand facing the NP was 19.14 x 106 Kilograms of metal
output. The world pr ce for cobalt in 1975 was $8.8 per Kilogram. Sub-
stituting the values (f D, P and b, which is the price elasticity of de-
mand in equation 2, lads to
19.14 x 106 = A(8.8) 1.7
or A = 7.82 x 108
The static demand formulation then becomes
D = 7.82 x 108p-1.7 (3.3)
The lower bound for P is determined by the marginal cost of NC and the
upper bound, in theory, by setting demand equal to zero. However, since
the elasticity was estimated with an upper bound of P = $12.2/Kg it may
not be desirable to go much beyond this price and still retain the form
of equation 4 since almost nothing is known about the behavior of the co-
balt market at very high prices. Hence, an upper bound of P = $20/Kg is
chosen, somewhat arbitrarily. The marginal cost of the NC is $5.1/Kg.
(See Table 3.3)
The Demand Curve Facing the NP for Nickel
The major NP for nickel are Canada, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Australia, New Caledonia, Indonesia, Philippines, Rhodesia and South Africa.
The NP face a net demand curve which is the demand curve for imports
by the NC. An econometric attempt at estimating this demand curve did not
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lead to results with significant t-statistics. The long run elasticity
of demand for the output of the NP is probably greater than -1.0 because
substitutes for nickel are available in virtually all of its uses. .Co-
balt, manganese and copper are important alternates to nickel, although
the costs of substitution are not inconsiderable. Since nickel is highly
substitutable in the long run, especially with cobalt, a long run price
elasticity of net demand equal to that of cobalt has been selected, i.e.
1.7.
As in the case of cobalt, the demand curve facing the NP is assumed
to have the form
D = AP-bYc (3.4)
where the symbols have the meanings indicated earlier.
Since only a static formulation of the net demand curve is contem-
plated, Y, which is an index, can be set equal to 1 in 1975 and the de-
mand curve reduced to the familiar form
D = AP- b (3.5)
b, which is the price elasticity of demand for the output of the NP,
is -1.7.
Table 3.1 shows the world price and demand facing the NP from 1967
to 1975.
Substituting the 1975 values of metal demand and price in equation 5
leads to
604.5 x 10.6 = A(4.466)-1 7
or A = 7.696 x l0.
The specification for the net demand curve becomes
D = 7.696 x 109P-1'7 (3.6)
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The upper bound for price is taken to be $15/Kg and the lower bound
is the marginal cost of production from ocean mining, which is $1.9/Kg.
(See Table 3.'3) These bounds are selected on the same basis as described
for cobalt.
TABLE 3.1
Year Net Demand1 Price $/Kg
x10 Kg (constant 1975 $)
1967 301 1 3-322
1968 339.0 4-498
1969 315.2 4.136
1970 451'6 3-916
1971 447.2 3-872
1972 4556 3916
1973 513-6 4.048
1974 559'0 4.180
1975 604.5 4466
i i , m . .i .
Source: I Computed from data in U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook,
1969, 1972, 1976, Volume 1 and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Nickel -
1977, p. 3.
2 Computed from data in Nickel - 1977, op. cit., Table 7.
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The Demand Curve Facing the NP for Copper
The major non-communist exporters of copper are Canada, Chile, the
Philippines, South Africa, Australia, Zambia and Zaire. Table 3.2 shows
the demand met by the NP from 1967 to 1975, together with the U.S. pro-
ducer's price and the London Metals Exchange (LME) price for those years.
Following the custom adopted for cobalt and nickel, the net demand
curve facing the NP is assumed to have the static form
D = APb (3.7)
A recent analysis of the world copper market was conducted by Charles
River Associates. Their study revealed that the U.S. had a long-run price
elasticity of demand of -0.48 while the rest of the non-communist world
had a long-run price elasticity of demand of -0.15. Since the U.S. ac-
counts for 33.4% of the non-communist demand, according to the study, the
weighted average world long-run price elasticity is -.48 x .334 + -.15 x
.666 = -0.26.
The U.S. elasticity of supply was shown in the same study to be 0.61
and that of the other NC to be 4.14. The U.S. accounts for 25% of world
production and the other NC for about 10%. The weighted average price
elasticity of supply for the NC is
25 x 0.61 + x 4.14 = 1.6235 35
The elasticity of net demand or the demand facing the NP can be estimated
from the elasticity of total demand and elasticity of supply for the NC.
Let
T = total demand
N = net demand, i.e. demand facing NP
S = supply from the NC
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nT = price elasticity of total demand
nN = price elasticity of net demand
qS = price elasticity of NC supply
TABLE 3.2
Year Demand facingl US Producer2 Price L.M.E. Price3
NP x 106 Kg $/Rg $/Kg
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
2680 2
2797'4
2918'1
3026 9
3175 3
3502- 6
3781'2
4017'3
4072-7
1.37
1843
155
1'78
1'52
1.43
1858
1886
141
1 83
1890
2'15
1 96
1*43
1'35
2-16
2-24
1*23
Source: Computed from data in U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook,
Volume 1, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1974 and U.S. Bureau of Mines,
Copper - 1977, Table 1, p. 4.
2Source: Computed from data in Copper - 1977, op. cit., Table 6, p. 12.
Expressed in 1975 dollars.
3Source: Computed from data in U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commoditv
Summaries 1977, 1976 and International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics July 1974, p. 29. Expressed in 1975 dollars.
L.M.E. stands for London Metals Exchange.
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Clearly,
N = T - S
The NP meet the residual demand of the NC.
Suppose N is a fraction, F, of T. Then,
N = FT
S = (1-F)T
(3.8)
Taking derivatives with respect to price, P, in equation (3.8) re-
sults in
dN dT dS
dP - dP dP
Multiplying equation (3.9) by ,
dN P dT P dS P
d - aP T dP T
or
dN P - dT P dS P
F N -dT T (1-F) dP S
But,
dN P
dP N
(3.9)
dT P
nN '2PT nT
and,
dS P 
dP S
so that,
F nN = nT - (1-F)nS
or
T 1 -F
nNN F- - F rs (3.10)
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The NP account for 60% of the NC total demand market, so that f = 0.60.
Substituting the values of nT and S in (3.10) yields the value of nN= -1.48.
The demand curve facing the NP for copper can now be obtained. The
world price for copper in 1975 was unusually low, being $1.23/Kg compared
with an average of $1.8/Kg for 1967 to 1975. Substituting the latter price
and the 1975 net demand for copper in equation (3.7),
4072.7 x 106 = A (1.8)
or
A = 97.2 x 108
The net demand curve facing the NP is
D = 97.2 x 108 p-1. 48 (3.11)
The upper limit for the price in this formulation is set at $8/Kg
and the lower limit at $1.23 which is the lowest price attained by cop-
pcr on the London Metals Exchange during the period 1967 to 1975. The
upper bound is the price at which the demand for copper is substantially
reduced in the long run. Normally, the lower bound for the price would
have been the marginal cost of production from ocean mining, but in the
case of copper this is $1.5/Kg (see Table 3.3), which is higher than
$1.23/Kg that was the price quoted on the London Metals Exchange in 1975
and also higher than the $1.41/Kg which was the U.S. producer's price in
1975.
COSTS OF OFFSHORE PRODUCTION
The components of cost involved in deep ocean mining are (i) pre-
operational costs consisting of research and development, exploration
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and prospecting, capital equipment for mining, transportation and pro-
cessing and (ii) operational costs related to energy, labor materials,
insurance and general administration incurred while mining, transpor-
ting and processing the ferromanganese deposits.
On the basis of research being conducted at M.I.T., it appears that
the pre-operational costs will be around $186 million per million metric
tons of processing capacity for a hypothetical deep ocean mining venture.
The operating costs before capital changes might be $17.1 million per mil-
lion tons of recovered nodules. The M.I.T. group has assumed a cost of
debt of 10%. This appears low considering the risk class of the invest-
ment. The risks relate to technological, business, political, legal and
environmental factors. It seems reasonable to expect that a risk premium
should be added. A premium of 3.5% is assumed in the analysis that follows.
A 13.5% capital change is close to the minimum that analysts from a U.S.
mining company and a high technology firm, both closely involved in ocean
mining consortia, have indicated would be applicable. The cost of capital
charge, the allocations of pre-operations capital spending over the life
* The research group has been led by Professor J.D. Nyhart and has in-
cluded Lance Antrim and Arthur Capstaff. A document that summarizes much
of the work is J.D. Nyhart, et al, A Cost Model of Deep Ocean Mining and
Associated Regulatory Issues, M.I.T., Sea Grant Program, MITSG 78-4, M.I.T.,
Cambridge, MA, March 1978.)
** This charge is in the form of interest on debt. Representatives from
British Petroleum, Deepsea Ventures and Westinghouse Corporation, among
others, have voiced the concern that even this expensive debt may'be very
difficult to obtain if there are any legal risks associated with the ven-
ture. These observations were noted at a workshop sponsored by the M.I.T.
Sea Grant at M.I.T. on April 6, 1978. It might be mentioned that these
same representatives indicated that when undertaking a financial analysis
of deep ocean mining, the hurdle internal rate of return (IROR) would have
to be around 18% to 20%. This is in IROR unadjusted for legal or politi-
cal risk.
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of the ocean mining venture (taken to be 20 years in defining a mine site)
and the operating costs together yield a figure of $51.41 per metric ton
on harvested nodules. This is the cost of producing the joint product re-
source from the deep oceanbed.
Since no manganese will be recovered, at least by the first genera-
tion consortia, this cost must be distributed among cobalt, copper and
nickel.
It is expected that mining and transporting might account for 40 of
the cost and processing for the rent. While mining and transportation can
be allocated on the basis of abundance, processing cannot because the costs
associated with it are not directly proportional to abundance. Cobalt is
the most difficult to process, followed by nickel and then by copper. Some
industry and consulting sources feel that on an average, processing costs
will be distributed in the following approximate manner: cobalt, 28%; cop-
per, 25%; nickel, 47%.
Processing will probably account for 60% of costs,and mining and trans-
portation for the rest. Consequently, mining and transportation account for
$20.56 per ton and processing for $30.84 per ton. On the basis of an abun-
dance of 0.2% for cobalt, 1.1% for copper and 1.3% for nickel, the mining
and transportation costs are $1.6 for cobalt, $8.7 for copper and $10.3 for
nickel. The processing costs of $30.84 are allocated on the basis of the
costs distribution mentioned earlier and are $8.6 for cobalt, $7.8 for cop-
per and $14.40 for nickel. As Table 3.3 indicates, these figures imply a
cost per kilogram of $5.1 for cobalt, $1.9 for nickel and $1.5 for copper.
* The names of the sources and their organizational affiliations are with-
held on request. The distribution of costs takes into account both abun-
dance and extractive difficulty.
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TABLE 3.3
Costs of Production for Ocean Mining
Mineral Abundance Mining and Trans- Processing Costs Per
Kg/M.T. portation Costs Costs Kilogram
Cobalt 2 $1.6 $8.6 $5.1
Copper 11 $8.7 $7.8 $1.5
Nickel 13 $10.3 $14.4 $1.9
A comparison of the costs of producing from onshore and offshore mines
is presented in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4
Marginal Costs of Production for NP and Ocean Mining Operations
(Figures in $/Kg)
Mineral Marginal Cost of Production, NP Ocean Mining
Cobalt 4.3 5.1
Copper 1.1 1.5
Nickel 1.6 1.9
Notes: The marginal cost of producing from onshore mines was obtained as
follows: For cobalt -- Charles River Associates, Cartelization in the World Cobalt
Market: Economic Analysis and Policy Implications, Cambridge, MA, August 1976.
For copper-- private communication with Ms. Pat Folley, graduate student,
Department of Material Science, M.I.T., January 1978, and Tim Metz, "U.S. Cop-
per Concerns Prepare to Petition for Substantial Rise in Duty on the Metal,"
The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1978, p. 12.
For nickel -- private communication with Mr. John Corrick, Bureau of
Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, January 1978.
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CHAPTER 4: MODEL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The game theoretic model developed in Chapter 2 is applied here to
marine ferromanganese minerals. There are essentially two purposes to
the exercise:
(i) To explore the distribution of rents between the NP and the
NC and the composition of these rents in terms of prices, mar-
ket shares output shares from deep ocean mining, and royalties
on technol gy and production, if any.
(ii) To examine the impact of linking minerals in a joint commodity
agreement when the markets for these minerals are of vastly
different sizes. It is worth noting perhaps that cobalt is a
high priced mineral with a small market, nickel is a medium
priced mineral with a medium market, and copper is a relatively
low priced mineral with a large market.
Specifically, it is of interest to
(a) Analyze what happens to the world cobalt market when
cobalt, nickel and copper are made the subject of an
international joint comnodity agreement, and
(b) What happens to the prices of the three minerals when they
are produced from a joint product resource. This resource
yields cobalt, nickel and copper in proportions which are
very different from the proportions of the net world de-
mand markets for these minerals.
In this chapter the static scenarios only will be analyzed since the
static analysis captures most of the features of interest. A dynamic form-
* In practice, the NP and NC will play a game with incomplete information or
an I-game. In such an event the actors will assign subjective probability
distributions over some space of payoff functions. If the subjective pro-
bability distributions satisfy a certain mutual consistancy requirement
then any given I-game, G, will be equivalent to a certain game with complete
information, called the "Bayes-equivalent" G* of G. It has been shown by
John C. Harsanyi that any Nash equilibrium point of this Bayesian game yields
a "Bayesian equilibrium point" for the original game and conversely. The equil-
ibrium will be unique and in the manner of Nash, pareto-optimal. For proof of
this see "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players. Part
II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points," Management Science, Vol. 14, No. 5, Jan. 1968.
** It is anticipated that the greatest impact of deep seabed mining will be
on the international market for cobalt.
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ulation of the model is presented in Appendix 2, but because of its com-
putational complexity, it is not solved. It is expected, however, that
the solution to the static cases will be of a validity that permits gen-
eral conclusions about the economics and management of deep ocean mineral
resources.
In the sections that follow the threat point outcomes are first deter-
mined, the three scenarios discussed in Chapter 2 are analyzed, and finally,
conclusions based on model results are presented.
The Threat Point Outcomes
The threat point solutions to the games need to be determined before
the bargaining model can be applied, since the cooperative solution depends
on the threat point.
Since the threat point is a non-cooperative outcome, it is a simple
matter to calculate the rents to the NP and NC at this point. The NP pre-
vent market entry by the NC by setting a limit price that reduces the rents
of the NC to zero. This price is clearly the marginal cost of the NC. There
is no need to set a limit price below this. Since the marginal costs of the
NP are lower than that of the NC, the former still reap a positive rent,
though it might be expected that this rent would be lower than that ensuing
from cooperation. If it was not, there would be no incentive to negotiate.
For cobalt the threat point rent is
RC= , Rp (5.1-4.3) 7.82 x 108 (5.1)-1.7 = $39.2 x 106
This is obtained by calculating the demand at the limit price and
multiplying this by the rent per unit of demand.
For nickel, the threat point rent is
RNC , RNp= (1.9-1.6) 76.96 x 108 (1.9)-1 7 = $775 x 106
NC~ ~~~~~~~~~~ : N77
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For copper, the threat point rent is
RNC Rp = (1.5-1.1) 97.2 x 108 (1.5)-148 = $930.1 x 106
The Solutions to the Static Model
The model is first applied to cobalt, considering ferromanganese depo-
sits a single product resource where only cobalt is of interest, then to
cobalt and nickel as joint products, and finally to cobalt, nickel and
copper as joint products. The purpose of this is to trace the sensitivity
of the solutions to single product and joint product formulations. In par-
ticular, it is desirable to investigate how the actors in the cobalt, nic-
kel and copper markets make trade-offs when they are compelled to bargain
jointly.
Further, several different variations of Scenario 1 will be tested
to determine whether there is a preferred model that best captures the
essential elements of the problem. In all, nine variations of Scenario 1
are considered and the results summarized in Table 4.1.
Next, Scenarios 2 and 3 are analyzed using the complete joint product
formulations.
There are two basic techniques available for solving the model. The
first method involves taking partial derivatives of the objective function
with respect to the policy variables, equating to zero (these being the
boundary conditions) and thereby securing a set of simultaneous equations
which can be solved to yield the optimal values of the policy variables.
This, however, can rapidly become very cumbersome if the equation is some-
what complicated and the number of terms even moderately large.
The other technique involves undertaking a global search of all values
of the objective function, with specified bounds, for possible combinations
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of policy variables. Provided the number of policy variables is not large,
the cycle time on a computer is quite small and the global search method is
more straightforward than the simultaneous equations method. Both methods
were used to solve the following models, depending on the complexity and
computational time involved.
Scenario 1: Both NP and NC produce, no transfer payments
A: Same Market-Share for Each Mineral
The model is solved for cobalt, nickel and copper with the same market
share variable for all three. The purpose of this is to investigate the im-
pact of adding nickel and copper NP and NC to the cobalt analysis. The rela-
tive size of the nickel and copper markets is much larger than the cobalt mar-
ket and it may be of some interest to determine the consequences of linking
the markets in a general commodity agreement that covers all three minerals.
(i) Cobalt
RNp = (P-4.3) BAP 1.7
RNp = $39.2 x 106
RNC = (P-5.1) (l-B) AP 1 7
RNC = 
A= 7.82 x i08
The symbols have the meanings assigned to them in Chapter 2.
Max R = (RNp - RN) (RNC RC)
P,B
The game solution resulted in
P = $11.04/Kg, B = 0.721
The NP have a market share of 0.721 and the world price is decided at
$11.04/Kg.
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RNp = $64.08 x 106, RNC = $21.86 x 106 .
The price of $11.04/Kg is higher than the real price of $8.8/Kg that
prevailed in 1975. It seems that in 1975, full market power was not being
exerted by the producers of cobalt so that the price was somewhat lower than
the monopoly price. However, it may be expected that as Zaire and others see
the threat of new entry posed by ocean mining and reconcile themselves to its
inevitability, they will raise the price of cobalt to its monopoly level to
maximize short term gains. There is little point in keeping the price below
the monopoly level if new entry cannot be discouraged. Since ocean mining
cannot be discouraged in the long run, Zaire and others may as well maximize
short run rent. It is instructive to note that by January 1978, the real
price of cobalt (expressed in 1975 dollars) had indeed been raised to $12.1/Kg.
The game solution does not yield a monopoly price because of the different mar-
ginal costs of the NP and the NC. It does, however, solve for the price where
the rents of both are maximized, subject to bargaining.
The net demand for cobalt metal, in this scenario, is 13.2 x 106 Kg.
This implies that the NP produce 3.68 x 106 Kg from the deep oceans. Since
these numbers are based on 1975 data, they understate potential production
from offshore mines because by the time ocean mining gets underway, auto-
nomous growth in demand will have raised the total world demand levels by
about a third. Commercial ocean mining is not expected to start until 1985
at the earliest, and more likely by 1990. Since total demand will be greater,
the absolute share of ocean mining and consequently the rents of production,
will also be higher than indicated by the bargaining model which solves for
an outcome that simulates both onshore and offshore mining in 1975. In any
event, the relationship among the various rents and production levels will
not change, just their magnitude.
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The technological development that makes deep ocean mining possible
has changed the environment for the world cobalt industry which must ad-
just to potentially large new sources of supply. In this situation the
NP will pursue a policy of minimizing the costs inflicted on them by the
entry of NC in the market, who of course will pursue a policy of maximizing
their rents of production. The bargaining model developed here solves for
the pareto-optimal outcome, given the strategies of the NP and the NC.
Since the first generation of ocean mining firms is expected to con-
sist of five consortia and each consortium will probably operate one mine,
the cobalt mining operation will have to function at well below capacity to
conform to the bargaining solution. Each mine site has an annual capacity
of 6 x 106 Kg so that at full capacity the five consortia could easily
satisfy the world net demand for cobalt. The total market share of the
mining consortia is 3.68 x 106 Kg under the solution obtained above, which
implies a 12% capacity utilization per mine in 1975 and 16% by 1985. While
this does not mean that only 12% or 16% of the nodules will be mined since
the total mining operation must take into account the demand for nickel
and copper as well, as shown in subsequent analysis, it does imply that
with improved technology, a decrease in mining costs or any other change
in a bargaining parameter, the ocean mining consortia will be able to ex-
pand output rapidly. This will be especially true if the unprocessed or
semi-processed ore is stockpiled near the refining sites. This excess
capacity could be a source of vexation and temptation to the mining con-
sortia and over time it may be that theland-based producers will feel
increasing pressure on their market share. Once the inevitability of
ocean mining is established, the economic dimension of the bargaining
game may continue to shift in favor of the consortia from the present NC.
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The ratio of ocean-based cobalt reserves to land-based cobalt reserves is
high enough for the former to be uninfluenced by issues of depletion and
the latter influenced by concerns over exhaustion. This implies that
while marginal costs will remain constant in real terms over the near
future for ocean mining, they can be expected to rise hyperbolically for
land-based mining. The convergence in marginal costs will further erode
the bargaining position of the NP.
The strategy for the NP, in the short run, must take the arguments
just presented into account. Since preventing entry by the NC results
in a threat point outcome for the NP, it is better to negotiate because
a bargained solution dominates the threat. However, once the NP are re-
conciled to new entry there is no reason why until entry takes place prices
should not be set to maximize profits. There is no longer a restraint on
exercising full market power. This indeed is what seems to be happening
in the world cobalt market. From $8.8 Kg in 1975 the real price has gone
to $12.1 Kg in early 1978 with a still higher price anticipated by the end
of the year. Since the price elasticity of demand in the short run is around
-0.3 in the relevant price range, a steady rise in real prices may be expected
until ocean mining starts. After the onset of offshore production, the price
will then fall to around $11/Kg which is the intermediate term equilibrium
bargained price. This price will, of course, change as the relative marginal
costs change with technological evolution and operating experience offshore
and declining grade quality of the ores onshore.
(ii) Cobalt and Nickel
The objective functions of the NP and NC are expanded to include the
rents for nickel. The NP and NC bargain simultaneously about the market
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share and the prices of cobalt and nickel. In this scenario, the NC con-
sider cobalt and nickel as a joint product, and the NP unite to bargain as
a unit.
The formulation of the model is based on the joint product model dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. The subscripts 1 and 2 refer to cobalt and nickel,
respectively.
RNp = (P,-4.3)BA1P_1 7 + (P2-1.6)BA2P21'7
R = 814.2 x 106
NP
RNC = (P1-5.1) (1-B)AP1 7 + (P2-1.9) (1-B)A2P21 7
ROC = 0
Al = 7.82 x 108
A2 = 76.96 x 108
Max R = (RNp-Rp) (RNC RNC)
P1 P 2'B
The bargaining solution is
P1 $11/Kg, P2 = $4.1/Kg, B = 0.72
RNP = $1322.4 x 106, RNC = $452.6 x 106
The price for cobalt at $11/Kg and the market share for the NP at
0.72 is very similar to the values of $11.04/Kg and the market share of
0.721 obtained in the preceeding analysis. The rents to the NP for cobalt
are $64 x 106, which are almost identical to the rents of $64.08 x 106 ob-
tained in the case preceeding. As long as nickel and cobalt are tied to
the same market share, the actors in the cobalt market turn out to be in-
different between bargaining separately and bargaining jointly with the
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actors.in the nickel market. This happens to be the outcome of this par-
ticular game and is not a general result of linking objective functions.
It turns out later, in another scenario, that the nickel market provides
an umbrella for the cobalt market and the game outcome in this scenario is
actually dominated by the actors in the nickel market. This works to the
disadvantage of the NP for cobalt, as will be shown subsequently.
The bargained price for nickel at $4.1/Kg is somewhat lower than the
price that prevailed in 1975, $4.5/Kg. The rents to the NP for nickel are
$1258.4 x 106 which indicates that the size of the nickel market is far lar-
ger than the cobalt market, and consequently the NP and NC for nickel may
dominate the bargaining. The rents of $1258.4 x 106 are lower than the
rents of $1732.5 x 106 secured by them before the advent of ocean mining,
but considerably higher than the threat point rents of $775 x 106. It
clearly pays the NP to bargain.
The solution for nickel also indicates that perhaps in 1975 nickel was
being overpriced. This could be because in 1975, and until very recently,
the price-setter in world nickel markets was INCO of Canada and the price
of $4.5/Kg may have been the profit maximizing price for INCO but not for
the industry as a whole. With the erosion of INCO's pre-eminence in the
world nickel market the price of the metal declined in real terms from 1975
to 1977. In January 1978, the price of the metal was $4.15/Kg in constant
1975 dollars. This compares with the bargained price of $4.1/Kg.
An interesting feature of the nickel market is that the most important
onshore producer, INCO, is also the dominant member of an ocean mining con-
sortium. A well-behaved monopolist would attempt to secure control of al-
ternative sources of supply in order to minimize competitive threat. INCO
seems to be responding to this theory. As a member of an ocean mining con-
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sortium it belongs to both the NP and the NC and is in an enviable position
to influence both sides in the bargaining process. Its strategy is probably
to maximize total rents, that is, from both onshore and offshore mining,
rather than concentrate on just land-based production. It probably expects
to make up from ocean mining any rents it may have to forego from onshore
mining as a consequence of a bargain between the NP and NC.
(iii) Cobalt, Nickel and Copper
The objective functions of the NP and NC are further expanded to incor-
porate the actors in the copper market. Once again, the NP and NC bargain
for the same market share across minerals. The subscript 3 refers to copper.
RNp = (P1-4.3)BA1Pll + (P2-1.6)BA2P217 + (P3-1.1)(1-B)A3P31'48
Rp = 1744.3 x 106
RNC (Pl-5.1)(1-B)A1Pll 7 + (P2-1.9)(1-B)A 2P21 + (P3-l.5)(l-B)A3P31 
RNC = 0
Al - 7.82 x 108
A2 76.96 x 108
A3 = 97.20 x 108
Max R (RNp-R°p) (RNC-R°C)
P1,PPThe bargaining outcome is
The bargaining outcome is
P1= $11.2/Kg, P2 = $4.2/Kg, P3 = $3.9/Kg, B = 0.66
RN = $3606.7 x 106, RNC = $1609.7 x 106
The price of $11.2/Kg for cobalt is again close to the prices obtained
in the two earlier cases. The joint market share of 0.66 for the NP, however,
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is lower than the 0.72 that prevailed earlier. The solution implies rents
of $58.6 x 106 for the NP for cobalt which are lower than the rents of a-
bout $64 x 106 in the two cases preceeding. The NP for nickel obtain rents
of $1151.5 x 106 which are lower than the $1258.4 x 106 in the earlier case.
The rents to the NP for copper are $2396.6 x 106 which compare favorably
with the threat point rents of $930.1 x 106 for them. Clearly, the size
of the copper market dominates the cobalt and nickel markets. Both the NP
for cobalt and nickel are forced to forego rents when they bargain jointly
with the NP for copper.
The price for nickel at $4.2/Kg is slightly higher than the $4.1/Kg
in the earlier analysis, but the market share at 0.66 is lower than the
share of 0.72 when only nickel and cobalt were considered.
The negotiated price of copper at $3.9/Kg is slightly higher than the
price of $1.23/Kg which prevailed in 1975. The latter price was admittedly
depressed by historical standards but the negotiated price is considerably
larger than even the historical peaks in the price of copper. There is an
important difference in the world markets for nickel and cobalt on one hand
and copper on the other. In the case of copper, there is no dominant pro-
ducer and no recognized price-setter. Despite the efforts of CIPEC, the
copper cartel prices are much closer to their competitive levels at present
than in the markets for either cobalt or nickel. The bargained price repre-
sents an approximation of the rent maximizing price that would be set by an
oligopolistic or monopolistic industry.
B: Separate Market Shares for Each Mineral
The basic price and market share model was simulated with the modifi-
cation that separate market shares were determined for each mineral. This
provided greater flexibility in the bargaining.
-53-
(iv) Cobalt and Nickel
The objective functions of the NP and NC for cobalt and nickel are
added together and a bargained outcome of prices and market shares sought.
RNp = (P1-4.3)B1A 1P 1 7 + (P2-1.6)B2A2P 2
RNp = 814.2 x 106
RNC = (P-5.1)(1-B 1)A1PP1 7 + (P2-1.9)(1-B2)A2P 2
R0 C 0NC
The subscripts 1 and 2 refer to cobalt and nickel, respectively.
Max R = (RNp -Rp) (RNC-RNC)
P1 P2 B1,B2
The bargaining outcome is
P1 = $10.5/Kg, P2 = $4.1/Kg, B1 = 0.98, B2 = 0.71
RN = $1328.14 x 106, RNC = $447.57 x 106
The price of cobalt at $10.5/Kg is lower than encountered in the pre-
vious cases, but the market share of the NP at 0.98 is much higher. The
rents to the NP for cobalt are $87.3 x 106 and these are considerably higher
than the rents earned in the cases analyzed thus far. Clearly, by introducing
flexibility in the market shares, the NP for cobalt gain. It pays them to
have the cobalt and nickel markets linked in the bargaining process. The
far larger size of the nickel market shifts the focus of bargaining to that
metal and the NP for cobalt scarcely lose market share. They do, however,
settle for a price lower than that secured in the fixed market share, joint
product or single product negotiations but since their objective is maxi-
mizing rents rather than price, this can be no hardship.
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The prices of $4.1/Kg for nickel is the same as attained for the fixed
share cobalt and nickel case and the market share of 0.71 for the NP for nic-
kel is only slightly lower than the 0.72 attained in the earlier bargain.
Owing to the slight decrease in market share, the rents for the NP for nickel
fall to $1240.8 x 106 from $1258.4 x 106. The loss of $17.6 x 106 for the
NP for nickel is less than the gain of $23.3 x 106 for the NP for cobalt, so
that as a bargaining group the NP are better off than in the fixed market share
case. To persuade the NP for nickel to adopt the flexible market share posi-
tion, the NP for cobalt could make a side payment of $17.6 x 106 and still
emerge $5.7 x 106 to the good.
The NC earn total rents of $447.6 x 106 which are lower than the total
rents of $452.6 x 106 obtainable in the fixed market share case. The diffe-
rence of $5 x 106 is very close to the net gain of $5.7 x 106 for the NP.
The NP for cobalt might then have to make a side payment of $5 x 106 to the
NC to persuade them to agree to this game. They would still be $0.7 x 106
ahead. The implication is that once side payments are made the fixed and
flexible market share games are almost equivalent. Without side payments,
of course, the NP for cobalt gain with the flexible market shares and the
NP for nickel and the NC lose. The fixed market share analysis shows the
consequences of linking two very unequal markets in a joint commodity agree-
ment. The outcome on the allocation of production is dominated by the actors
in the much larger market. The market share for the NP for nickel is forced
on the NP for cobalt in the fixed share case. When the markets are delinked,
the outcome for the nickel market is hardly changed, but the rents to the NP
for cobalt rise by 36% and the price falls by 4.5%.
Since the ferromanganese deposits are a joint product resource, the
ocean mining firms would clearly like to extract both nickel and cobalt
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owing to the common costs of exploration side preparation and transpor-
tation. It is their joint product attribute that permits the allocation
of long run marginal costs and thereby lowers per mineral costs since ex-
ploration, harvesting and transportation are shared costs. If only one
mineral was extracted, all costs would have to be allocated to it and
this would make ocean mining uncompetitive. The fixed market share
model implies a demand for offshore cobalt of about 5 x 106 Kg and for
offshore nickel of about 260 x 106 Kg by 1985. With five consortia, the
per firm output would have to be 1 x 106 Kg of cobalt and 52 x 106 Kg of
nickel. Since each oceanbed mine can yield a flow of 6 x 106 Kg of cobalt
and 39 x 106 of nickel, the solution implies a 17% capacity utilization
per site for cobalt and 133.3% for nickel. This means that two mine
sites per consortium will be needed with each site having an 8% utili-
zation for cobalt and a 67% utilization for nickel. Since enough ferro-
manganese deposits must be mined to extract 52 x 106 Kg of nickel, each
consortium must harvest 4 x 106 metric tons of dry nodules per annum by
1985.
The flexible market share model indicates a demand of 0.38 x 106 Kg
for oceanbed cobalt and 269.6 x 106 Kg for oceanbed nickel by 1985. This
means that ocean mining will really be undertaken only for nickel and all
costs will have to be allocated to nickel, which would defeat the purpose
of exploiting a joint product resource.
This indicates the difficulty in linking markets of greatly unequal
sizes. The smaller cobalt market is dominated by the nickel market and
the game solution concentrates on allocating the rents from nickel pro-
duction because the rents from cobalt production are a small fraction
of the former.
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(v) Cobalt, Nickel and Copper
As before, the objective functions are expanded to incorporate the
actors in the copper market. The results are instructive and illustrate,
again, the significant impact of linking the copper market with those of
cobalt and nickel in a commodity bundle agreement. The subscripts 1, 2
and 3 refer to cobalt, nickel and copper, respectively.
17 +( -1.48
RNp = (P1-4.3)B1A1P1 7 + (P2-1.6)B2A2P21 7 + (P3-1.1)B 3A3P3 48
R = 1744.3 x 106NP
RNC = (P1-5.1)(1-B 1)A1P 7 +(P2-1.9)(1-B 2)A2P2 1 7 + (P3-1.5)(1-B 3)A3P3 48
ROC = 0NC
Max R = (RNp - R p) (RNC - RC)
P1'P2'P3'B1 'B2'B3
The negotiated outcome is
P1 = $12.4/Kg, P2 = $4.6/Kg, P3 = $3.4/Kg
B1 = O, B2 =, B3 11 2 3
RNp = $3654.31 x 106, RNC =$1631.19 x 106
The solution allocates all cobalt and nickel production to offshore
mining at prices higher than obtained in the previous cases. This would
have each mining consortia producing about 2.9 x 106 Kg of cobalt and
152.9 x 106 Kg of nickel from offshore mines by 1985. The ratio of nickel
to cobalt abundance in ferromanganese deposits is around 6.5 to 1 and the
ratio of nickel to cobalt net demand is 52.7 to 1. While only one mine
(at less than 50% capacity utilization) would meet the production needs
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of each consortia, four mines would be needed to satisfy the nickel re-
quirements of each consortium.
To meet all the world net demand for nickel from offshore mining by
1985 would require the harvesting of 58.8 x 106 tons of dry nodules. This
does not seem feasible by 1985, when given the technological and investment
constraints, not more than ten offshore mines could be in operation.
The bargaining solution also allocates no copper production to ocean-
bed mining. The price again is much higher than historically recorded and
would probably not be politically acceptable to consumers of copper. The
very large size of the copper market in relation to nickel and cobalt mar-
kets accounts for this solution. The NP for copper dominate the NP for
nickel and cobalt when the markets are linked in a negotiating process and
bargain away all nickel and cobalt production in exchange for maintaining
their entire market share. The NP for nickel and cobalt end up with no
rents at all. The NP for copper obtain rents of $3654.3 x 106 in 1975
or $4860.2 x 106 by 1985. The NC secure rents of $1631.2 x 106 in 1975
or $2169.5 x 106 by 1985. As far as the NC are concerned, the rents for
the fixed and flexible market share cases are comparable. The NP for
copper gain considerably by moving from fixed shares (with rents of
$2396.5 x 106 in 1975) to flexible shares (with rents of $3656.3 in 1975).
The NP for nickel lose rents of $1151.5 x 106 and the NP for cobalt lose
rents of $58.6 x 106 in moving from the fixed to flexible market share
models. The NP for copper would have had to make total side payments of
$1210.1 x 106 to the NP for nickel and cobalt in 1975, leaving them with
rents of $2453.2 x 106, which is still better off than the fixed market
share case.
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(vi) Scenario lb: The Introduction of Consumer Surplus
The addition of consumer surplus to the objective function of the
NC drastically changes the results. The threat point for the NC is no
longer zero, but rather, the consumer surplus at the limit or no-entry
price.
The rent function of the NC is also expanded to include the consumer
surplus at the negotiated price. In none of the cases analyzed was a
negotiated solution obtained. The threat point always dominated. When
consumer surplus is taken into account, negotiations break down and the
non-negotiated solution is preferred. The reason for this is illustrated
by the 3 product case (cobalt, nickel and copper) with flexible market
shares. The objective function of the NP remains unchanged and is given
by
RNp = (P1-4.3)B 1A1P1 + (P2-1.6)B 2A2P217 + (P3-1.1)B3A3 P3148
The threat point for the NP is also unaltered
ROp = $1744.3 x 106
The objective function for the NC, however, now includes the consumer sur-
plus at P, P2, P3, the negotiated prices for cobalt, nickel and copper.
Accordingly,
RNC = (P1-5.1)(1B 1)A LP 1 7 + Al P1 7 dP
P1
+ (P2-l.9)(1-B 2)A2P21 7 + A2P21 7 dP 2
(equation continued
on following page)
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+ (P3-1.5)(1-B 3)A3 31'48 + A3 P 48 dP3
P3
The threat point for the NC now becomes
20 15 8
ROC AP-1. 7 dP + A2P 1 7 dP2 + A3P 1.48 dP35.1 282 2 / 3 3
5.1 1.9 1.23
For copper, the lower limit of integration is the 1975 world price
rather than the marginal cost of production for the NC because the latter
at $1.5/Kg was higher than the world price. For cobalt and nickel the
lower limit of integration is the limit price, which is the marginal cost
of production for the NC.
Solving for RNC leads to
A1 1 1 A7 1 10
RC = 0.7 - (20.7 + 0 (1.9)'0'7 
-
~ 0.7
A3 1 1
+0.48 [ 23) 0.48 - ly_ 0.48]
where
Al 7.28 x 108 A2 76.96 x 108 AA 97.2 x 108
or
RNC = 16,439.4 x 106
Given this threat point for the NC, clearly no negotiated solution
is possible. The maximum rents earned by producer units from the NC are
less than $1.7 billion after a cooperative outcome. These are a small
fraction of the consumer surplus of more than $16 billion that results
from non-cooperation. The consumer surplus at the negotiated point when
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the rents to the NC are $1.7 billion is around $12.17 billion. The total
gain to the NC after negotiation is close to $13.9 billion which is more
than $2 billion under the gain to the NC from non-cooperation. Moreover,
the gain in consumer surplus for the NC far exceeds the loss in rent for
the NP as a consequence of negotiation breaking down. This result is
hardly surprising whet it is considered that consumers gain by extracting
the lowest possible pt ce from the market.
In discussing a gime for the minerals of the deep ocean, the bar-
gaining seems to be between the NP and the potential producer groups from
the NC. As far as the purely economic interests of consumers from the NC
are concerned, no regime may be the best solution. The efforts to devise
a regime seem to be an attempt to cater to producers groups from both the
NP and NC. When political considerations are ignored, the regime structure
may really be one that is a facade for a two-part cartel that effectively
fosters a collusive relationship between ocean mining consortia and the NP.
There are, of course, political reasons why a seabed regime is desirable,
but the trade-off between the political utility of such an agreement and
its economic disutility to the consumers of the NC should be clearly kept
in mind when price maintenance schemes and deep ocean mining production
ceilings are formulated.
To the extent the utility or benefits from navigation rights, the
freedom of scientific research, access to secure sources of supply, ac-
knowledging the moral obligation of international egalitarianism and the
gains from international interdependence can be quantified, it would be
useful to compare them with the loss in consumer surplus. The NC are
largely the industrialized democracies and the NP, with the notable and
complicating exception of Canada, are the nations of the South. The non-
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economic benefits of a law of the sea agreement as far as the NC are con-
cerned should be roughly equal to the loss in consumer surplus less gain
in rents of production for a negotiated settlement to be worthwhile. In
other words, the quantifiable non-economic, that is, largely political,
benefits of a law of the sea agreement accruing to the industrialized
nations of the North should be in the region of $2 billion per year and
increasing over time. The lack of an agreement on ocean mining will have
a negative impact on the ocean mining consortia, but may not be against
the best interests of the NC as a whole. The $2 billion figure may be
overstating matters somewhat since the analysis has neglected the multi-
plier effects of ocean mining on the economies of the NC. Perhaps the
political utility of an agreement together with the psychic income to
be derived from increased national security is worth the economic dis-
utility, but unless a careful assessment is made it is difficult to judge,
Even if the non-economic benefits to the NC are not equivalent to $2
billion or more per year, it may still be desirable to reach a negotiated
solution.
The pressure of international egalitarianism and interdependence,
coupled with the moral imperatives of U.S. foreign policy, might argue
for a transfer of real resources to the NP who are, largely, the nations
of the South. A negotiated solution would have the irresistible charm of
satisfying the liberal elites in the U.S. and Western Europe as well as
effectively hiding the $2 billion plus a year subsidy from the NC to the
NP from the scrutiny of the more conservative constituencies within the
nations of the North. There seems to be growing resistance among prag-
matic commentators in the U.S. to the idea of large resource transfers
from the North to South as called for in the New Economic Order. Perhaps
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the implicit transfer implied in a negotiated solution may be a less ob-
jectional form of undertaking aid to the South. Further, the negotiated
solution, despite its impliction for reduced consumer surplus, would be
consistent with the gneral philosophy of commodity agreements as es-
poused by the United ations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
(on behalf of the Sou h) and the Orderly Marketing Arrangements, lately
so dear to negotiator from the North. Both commodity agreements and
Orderly Marketing Agr ements (OMA) imply a loss of consumer surplus
through higher prices or protected markets, which translates into higher
prices. The revealed preference is then, for some sacrifice of consumer
surplus in favor of a gain to producer units from the North and the South
and for the gain in political utility derived from reduced international
tensions, greater stability in world markets, enhanced security of sup-
plies and less uncertain access to sources of supply.
UNCTAD sponsored commodity agreements seem to be acquiring support in
the nations of the North and the South. Control over and intervention in
mineral markets is no longer the subject of vigorous protest from govern-
ment officials or corporate planners within the U.S., Western Europe and
Japan, and it is fervently advocated by representatives from the nations
of the South. A negotiated agreement for the minerals of the deep seabed
would be merely a logical and consistent aspect and extension of this phe-
nomenon. Given the long run inevitability of an agreement, the question
of interest for producer groups from the NC is how they can maximize po-
tential rents and for producer groups from the NP how they can minimize
potential losses or acquire a share of the rents generated by developing
the minerals of the deep oceanbed.
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C: Other Variations of Scenario 1
Some alternative formulations of the model in Scenario 1 are con-
sidered here. The effects of linking copper have been discussed earlier.
The impact of partially disengaging the copper market from those of cobalt
and nickel is examined by first imposing the fixed market share solution
for cobalt and nickel on the copper market and solving for the world price
of copper. Next, the copper market is disengaged a bit further by first
determining the fixed market share solution for cobalt and nickel and then
adding to this solution the objective functions of the NP and NC for copper.
The bargained outcome for the world price of copper and the market shares
of the NP and NC for copper is then sought within this two-stage negotiating
framework.
The analysis so far has not been particularly realistic in that the
process constraint imposed by nature has been neglected. Every manganese
nodule contains, among other minerals, cobalt, nickel, and copper in cer-
tain proportions. While these proportions have a distribution of values
over the entire range of the manganese nodule population, the expected
values of the distribution can be used to model relative abundance.
Clearly, it is not possible to harvest x units of cobalt from the ocean-
bed without also harvesting y = y(x) units of nickel and z = z(x) units of
copper. Within limits, the problem is one of fixed proportions of abundance,
which, of course, is what one expects from a joint product resource.
It is to address this aspect of ocean mining that the joint product
nature of the resource is considered more explicitly in another formulation
that follows. A constraint is introduced that acknowledges the relative
abundance of cobalt, nickel and copper in ferromanganese deposits. Nickel
is about six and a half to seven times more abundant than cobalt and copper
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around five and a half to six times. Consequently, an ocean mining op-
eration that produces 1 unit of cobalt also has the potential of producing
7 units of nickel and 6 units of copper. This processing constraint is
built into the model by expressing the output shares for nickel and copper
as functions of the output share of cobalt. This will obviate the vexing
problem of having to exploit the oceanbed mine sites at vastly different
rates of capacity utilization suggested by the model solutions when rela-
tive abundance constraints are not explicitly considered.
C.1: Partially Disengaged Copper Market
(vii) Copper Price with Predetermined Market Share for Copper
The fixed market share solution of 0.72 for cobalt and nickel (see
formulation ii, cobalt and nickel, fixed B) is imposed on the copper mar-
ket and the world price of copper at this market share is determined.
The objective function of the NP for copper is added to the rents ac-
cruing to the NP for cobalt and nickel ($1322.4 x 106) and the objec-
tive function of the NC for copper is added to the negotiated rent to
the NC for cobalt and nickel ($452.6 x 106).
RNp = 1322.4 x 106 + (P3-1.1) 0.72 A3P3148NP 33
R°p = $1744.3 x 106
RNC = 452.6 x 106 + (P3-1.5) 0.28 A3P3168
RC = $0NC
Max R = (RNp - Rop) (RNC - R°C)
3
The negotiated solution is
P = $3.88/Kg, RNp= $3938 x 106 R $1323.4 x 1063 NP , RNC
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The price of copper is determined to be $3.88/Kg with the NP keeping 72%
of the market. The total rents to the NP are $3.94 billion in the sepa-
rate market shares case and $3.61 billion in the fixed market share case.
The price of copper is close to the $3.9/Kg in the fixed market share
analysis and higher than the $3.4/Kg in the separate market shares analy-
sis. The rents to the NC at $1.3 billion are lower than the rents of $1.61
billion in the fixed share and $1.63 billion in the separate shares cases.
The approximate gain of $0.3 billion to the NP is matched by the approximate
loss of $0.3 billion to the NC. Within the narrow context of the game a
transfer payment of $0.3 billion from the NP to the NC would make the out-
comes in the various cases equivalent. For the individual markets, of
course, the outcomes are far from equivalent.
The 0.28 market share solution implies that in 1975, 3.71 x 106 Kg
of cobalt, 195.7 x 106 Kg of nickel and 365.9 x 106 Kg of copper would
have to be recovered from the manganese nodules. If it is assumed that
cobalt demand rises by 3% per annum from 1975 to 1985, nickel and copper
demand by 2%, then almost 5 x 106 Kg of cobalt, 240 x 106 Kg of nickel,
and 450 x 106 Kg of copper will be harvested from the oceanbed by 1985,
when actual mining is expected to start. The solution implies that 3
mine sites per consortium would have to be developed to satisfy the cop-
per demand. This is not feasible in terms of the investments that must
be made, nor is it likely mine sites will be opened just to satisfy cop-
per demand, since the implied nickel demand can be met by 2 sites per
consortium and the cobalt demand by 1 site each.
Further, the high price of copper is also not likely to be accep-
table to consuming countries since it is far above historical peaks.
The copper market is simply too large to be linked with the cobalt and
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nickel markets unless a process constraint is introduced.
C.2: Process Constraints with Linked Market Shares
The process constraint is introduced explicitly in this scenario by
linking the nickel and copper production from offshore mines to that of
cobalt. Since nickel is almost 7 times as abundant as cobalt, and copper
almost 6 times as much, the process constraint is designed so that for
every unit of cobalt produced, a maximum of 7 units of nickel and 6 units
of copper are extracted.
Hence for nickel:
(1-B2) A2P21'7 = 7(1-B 1 ) AlP 1 7
or B2 = 1 -7A1 P1-1.7 (1 - B1)
A2 P2-1.7
or B = 1 - 0.662 P1.7(1 - B)
P2-1.7
And, for copper
B3 = 1 - 0.449 Pl 1.7(1 - B)
p3-1.7
(viii) Cobalt and Nickel
The objective functions of the NP and NC for cobalt and nickel are
combined and a negotiated solution for prices and market share is sought
with the process constraint kept in mind during the negotiations. The
solution can then be compared with other cases where the nickel market
was linked with the cobalt market.
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RN =(P43)B 7 + (P 2-1.6)(A 2P .7- 7AP 11 (1-B) )
RNp = $814.2 x 106
RNC = A1P 1 .7 (1-B1) ( (Pl-5.1) + 7(P2-1.9) )
R C: $0
Max R = (RNp - R~p) (RNC - RC)
P1 P 2B 1
The negotiated solution is:
P1 = $8.2/Kg, P2 = $4.2/Kg, B1 = O, B2 = 0.77
RN = $1346.8 x 106, RNC $419.8 x 106
The world price of cobalt is set at $8.2/Kg, of nickel at $4.2/Kg.
The NP for cobalt lose their entire net demand market to offshore pro-
duction and the NP for nickel retain 77% of the net demand market. At
these prices offshore production is determined to be 21.86 x 106 Kg for
cobalt in 1975 or 29 x 106 Kg by 1985 and 154.3 x 106 Kg for nickel in
1975. Each consortium would operate one mine at 70% of capacity in 1975
and close to capacity by 1985. The value of B1 and B2 will change over
the years because the net demand markets for cobalt and nickel are ex-
pected to grow at different rates. This will change the ratio of A2
to A1 over time, which in turn will influence the value of B2. The
difference, however, will not be large if as expected the net demand
growth for cobalt is 3% and for nickel 2%.
The negotiated prices for both cobalt and nickel are lower than in
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1975, with cobalt at $8.2/Kg versus the $8.8/Kg that prevailed in 1975
and with nickel at $4.2/Kg versus the $4.47/Kg in 1975. The NP for co-
balt lose completely in this bargain. Their market share of net demand
is zero compared with 0.72 when negotiating separately, with 0.72 when
nickel and cobalt markets are locked in a one share negotiation, with
0.66 when cobalt, nickel and copper markets are linked rigidly and with
0.98 when nickel and cobalt produces are linked with flexible market
shares. It does compare with the case, however, when cobalt, nickel and
copper markets are linked with flexible shares. The NP for nickel re-
tain 0.77 of the net demand hich is better than the 0.72 with cobalt
linked in a fixed share and 0.71 with cobalt linked in a flexible
share negotiation. It is also better than being linked with cobalt and
copper in the fixed share case, (0.66) and decidedly superior to being
linked with copper and cobalt in the flexible share case (0).
The consumers of cobalt in the NC gain consumer surplus through
lower prices and the mining consortia from the NC capture all the rents
of production. The consumers of nickel from the NC also gain through
lowered prices for that metal. The total rents to the NC at $419.8 x 106
are slightly lower than the rents of $452.6 x 106 and $447.6 x 106 in the
fixed and flexible share cases. The NP for nickel appropriate rents of
$1.35 billion, which is better than the almost $1.26 billion and $1.24
billion in the fixed and flexible share cases. The NP for nickel, there-
fore, could make a side payment of $90 million to the NP for cobalt (which
is more than the amount of rent $87 million, forgone by them in any of
the cases) and be indifferent to the various outcomes. Except for Moro-
cco, the other NP for cobalt extract it as a by-product of copper, lead,
zinc or nickel. If the NP for the metal were compensated at around $80 -
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$90 million per annum with the payments rising over time for a few
years (a form of protection money) then they might be persuaded to
phase out their cobalt operations. Morocco, the only producer of pri-
mary cobalt, will have depleted its economic reserves by 1985 anyway,
so its bargaining power will wane over time. In the short run, of
course, it will not be politically feasible to shut down operations so
the game solution is not acceptable for 1975. However, by 1985 the
solution may be more acceptable. Morocco will have become, at best,
a very minor producer and the other nations could begin shifting out of
cobalt. In the meanwhile, the NP for cobalt would raise real prices and
secure as much monopoly rent as possible. This is indeed what appears
to be happening. By early 1978, the real price of cobalt was almost
40% higher than its 1975 value, and rsing. The short term monopoly
profits plus a stream of transfer payments for say, ten years, might be
sufficient to persuade the NP for cobalt to agree to a negotiation out-
come where the entire net world demand is met by offshore cobalt by per-
haps 1990. The political feasibility of the transfer payment is open
to debate. It might be noted, however, that both Zambia and Zaire,
which are major producers of cobalt, are also important producers of
copper, so that if some agreement was reached on the latter mineral,
they might eventually be willing to forego the production of cobalt.
The other producers of cobalt, besides Morocco, are Botswana, New
Caledonia, Canada, and Australia, all of whom produce cobalt as a by-
product of copper or nickel. With an agreement on nickel and copper,
there would be no need for any considerable explicit side payments to
these countries. The side payments could be incorporated implicitly,
in the prices for nickel and copper. The only problem, then, would be
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Morocco, which for a few years might demand explicit compensations of
a few million dollars a year, but with its cobalt reserves being de-
pleted, it can hardly plead hardship beyond 1990. In summary, expli-
cit transfer payments to Morocco and implicit transfer payments to the
other NP for cobalt (in the form of prices and market shares for nickel
and copper) should provide the political mechanism for acceptance of the
negotiated solution.
(ix) Cobalt, Nickel and Copper
The addition of the copper market to the analysis is accomplished,
as in the previous case, by suitably expanding the objective functions
of the NP and NC.
RNp = (P1-4.3)B 1A1PT1 7 + (P2-1.6)B2A2P21 7 + (P3-1.1)B 3A3P31 48
where
-1.7
B2 = 1-7A 1 P1 (-B 1)
A - T.72 P-
and
-1.7
B3 =1 6A1 P1 (1-B 1)
: A -1.68
2 P3
Substituting B2 and B3 in RNp leads to
-17 A (1-B.)RNp = (P1-4.3)B1A1P 1 + (P2-1.6)(A 2P21 7 - 7A1P 7 (1-B1) )
+ (P3-1.1) (A3P3148 - 6AP1 1.48 (l-B) )
Rmp = $1744.3 x 106
RNC = (P1-5.1)(1-B 1)A1P 1 7 + (P2-1.9)(1-B 2)A2P21 7 + (P3-1.5)(1-B 3 )A3P31 48
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or, after simplifying,
RNC = AlP 1 7 (1-Bl) [(P1-5.1) + 7(P2-1.9) + 6(P3-1.6)]
ROC 0
Max R = (RNp - Rop) (RNC - RC)
P1'P2'P 3'B1
The negotiated outcome is
P1 = $5.4/Kg, P2 = $4.9/Kg, P3 = $3.7/Kg
B1 = 0, B2 = 0.397, B3 = 0.81
RNp = $3.63 billion, RNC = $1.53 billion
The market share of the NP for cobalt is again driven to zero, but
the world's price also falls from $8.2/Kg in the previous case to $5.4/Kg.
The consumers of cobalt clearly gain and the net demand for cobalt more
than doubles.
The market share of the NP for nickel falls to around 0.4 from 0.77
in the previous cases. The price, however, rises from $4.2/Kg to $4.9/Kg,
which is quite high. The rents to the NP for nickel are $628.7 x 106,
which are much lower than the $1346.8 x 106 earned in the previous case.
The impact of linking the copper market is to raise nickel prices, de-
press the market share of the NP and lower cobalt prices.
The copper price at $3.7/Kg is, again, high, but the NP retain 0.81
of the market share and earn rents of almost $3 billion. The NP for cop-
per would probably have to make a side payment of around $700 x 106 to
the NP for nickel and around $80 x 106 to the NP for cobalt to secure
their cooperation. This would drive the effective prices of copper for
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the NP to around $3.1/Kg, which is a figure that is still very attrac-
tive to producers and not too offensive to consumers. Since cobalt is
often a coproduct of nickel or copper on land, the NP for cobalt may
not have to be explicitly compensated by side payments except for short-
term flows to countries such as Morocco. The transfer payments to the
NP for nickel would c use the effective price to rise to almost $8/Kg
(for them), which of ourse is enough to compensate them for loss of
market share, since t :e concern is over rent -- and not production.
The consumers of nickel or copper would probably not be happy with the
prices, but the debate really is between producer units from both the
NP and NC, and, as an earlier analysis revealed, some consumer surplus
may have to be sacrificed to secure an international treaty. The re-
sult of a negotiated settlement, it may be noted, would be a very effec-
tive joint-cartelization of the world markets for cobalt, nickel, and
copper. This may be repugnant to those who still maintain a preference
for competitive markets, but it would not be inconsistent with the ideo-
logical predilections of UNCTAD, which vigorously tries to foster commo-
dity agreements, nor indeed, with those of international trade negotia-
tors from the industrialized democracies, who, of late, have grown in-
creasingly fond of Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMA). The latter are
a subtle form of cartelization. The price subsidies implied in the
solution above should also appeal to those liberal elites in the North
who believe that the moral imperatives of international egalitarianism
and the pressures of international interdependence argue for resource
transfers to the South. The mining consortia, too, should have little
cause to complain. Each of the five consortia would operate two mines
at about 80% of capacity in 1975 and at close to capacity by 1985.
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Whether they will be able or willing to make the investments necessary
to do so is not apparent. They should be able to do so by 1990.
The model discussed in the pages above seems to be the preferred
one for studying rent distribution, prices, and market shares. The
negotiated prices of copper and nickel take into account the side pay-
ments that must be made to the producers of cobalt by maintaining total
rents. Therefore, if the rents on cobalt production fall to zero, and
the rents on copper and nickel production rise, then the joint producers
of cobalt and nickel and cobalt and copper will not lose rents on balance,
which presumably is what they care about. The 7 to 12 year lag time be-
fore ocean mining becomes commercially important should provide a suffi-
cient time for adjustments.
Comparison of Alternative Formulations of Scenario 1
The results of the 10 formulations of the model that have been
analyzed so far are summarized in Table 4.1 for ease of reference.
The greatest variation in prices and market shares is associated with
cobalt, whose price ranges from $5.4/Kg to $12.4/Kg, in 1975 dollars.
This is probably a range that at the lower end is close to the mar-
ginal cost of offshore production, and at the upper end is near the
long run monopoly price given the current structure of the market. The
main reason for this range appears to be the relatively small size of
the net demand market for cobalt, so that when considered by itself,
the exertion of market power is manifest and when considered with nic-
kel and copper its rents and market share are bargained away by the NP
in an effort to preserve rents in the latter, more significant, markets.
Nickel and copper show considerable stability in prices ranging from
$4.1/Kg to $4.9/Kg.for nickel (compared with $4.5/Kg that prevailed in
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1975) and for copper from $3.4/Kg to $3.9/Kg (compared with $2.4/Kg in
1974 and $1.23/Kg in 1975). The price of nickel does not deviate greatly
from 1975 levels because presumably the NP were existing close to full
market power given that the nickel market for years has been like a mono-
polist (INCO) with a competitive fringe. Copper prices, on the other
hand,rise considerably above 1974-75 levels, indicating that the hitherto
ineffective copper cartel (CIPEC), finds cohesion when the NP are given
the opportunity to bargain as a unit and consequently market power is
exploited.
The fluctuation in market shares is linked with the size of the net
demand markets. The market share of the NP for cobalt ranges from 0.98
(only cobalt considered) to 0 (cobalt bargained away by the NP when linked
with nickel and copper). The market shares of the NP for nickel and copper
fluctuate less because of the much larger sizes of their markets. Nickel,
as might be expected, fluctuates more than copper, 0.40 to 0.77, which
ranges from 0.63 to 1.00.
In the next two sections scenarios 2 and 3 are discussed.
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SCENARIO 2: THE NC LICENSE THEIR TECHNOLOGY TO THE NP. ONLY THE NP PRODUCE.
In this scenario it is assumed that the NC, who through their mining
consortia are the repositories of the technology required to develop deep
seabed minerals, license it to the NP and refrain or are contractually for-
bidden to produce themselves. The NP use the technology to produce from the
ocean floor and pay the NC a royalty per unit of mineral produced.
The NP would probably not produce directly but through a transnational
entity such as the "Enterprise" which has been the subject of frequent and
protracted debate at the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. The Enterprise,
which may be the producing arm of a Seabed Authority, would probably pur-
chase the technology from the mining consortia and either produce itself,
or arrange for the mining consortia to manage the production under some sort
of combined technology licensing and management contract. The rents to the
NC would then be those that accrue from the sale of technology and manage-
ment skills.
The policy variables in this version of the case are the production
share of ocean resources, y, the technology (and management fee) royalty,
Q, expressed as a fraction of the world price in dollars per kilogram and
paid on that portion of the production which is derived from offshore mining,
and the world price P. The technology royalty, Q, is expressed as a function
of the P; it is bounded in such a manner that at its upper limit the rents
from offshore production are completely appropriated by the NC. This would
be the limiting value of Q at which the NP would be interested in producing
from the oceanbed.
* It has been so designated for lack of a suitable name. The terms was coined
by the delegates to UNCLOS III.
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The purpose of the analysis is to model an institutional arrangement
rather different from Scenario 1, where both the NP and NC produce, and
investigate the changes, if any, in rents to the NP and NC, the share of
oceanbed minerals in world demand and the negotiated prices.
The discussion relating to Scenario 1 has made it obvious that pro-
cess constraints would have to be introduced explicitly in the model. This
is done when first nickel and then nickel and copper are linked with cobalt.
The impact of linking nickel, cobalt and copper in an international joint
commodity agreement continues to be of interest.
(i) Cobalt
The rents to the NP are the sum of rents from land-based production
and ocean-based production, less the technology royalty paid to the NC
on the latter. The rents to the NC are, of course, the technology royalty
on ocean-based production.
RNp = (P1-4.3)(1-l )A1P1 7 + (P(l-Q1)- 5.1)y1AlP 1
ROp = $39.2 x 106
O<y<l , O0<Q< 1 - l5.1
Max R = (RNp - Rp) (RNC - RC)
P1Q1y
The bargaining result is
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P1 = $11/Kg, Q1 = 0.54, y1 = 0.28
RNP = $64 x 106, RNC = $21.9 x 106
The world price for cobalt is set at $11/Kg with 0.28 of the net
world demand being satisfied by offshore production. The mining consor-
tia collect a technology royalty of $5.94/Kg of oceanbed cobalt mined by
the NP.
The NC, through the mining consortia which license their technology
earn rents exclusively from royalties on technology, while the NP earn
rents from onshore production. It is observed that the rents from off-
shore production are appropriated completely by the royalties on techno-
logy.
(ii) Cobalt and Nickel
The objective function of the NP and NC are expanded to include the
action in the nickel market.
-1.7 -1.7
RN = (P1-4.3)(1-yl)A 1Pi 7 + (P (1-Q1 )-5.1)y 1A1P1
+ (P2-1.6)(1-Y2)A2P 12 + (P2(l-Q2)-l.9)y 2A2 P21
Ro = $814.2 x 106
-0.7 -0.7
RNC = Q1Y1A1P 1 + Q2Y2A2P2
RC = 0
7A1 P.7
<_¥1 - 1
2 2
5.1 1.9O<Q1 < 1 -5. 0 <Q 2 <1- 11 P2
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Max R (RNp- R p) (RN - RNC)
P 'P2'Q1 'Q2' 1
The bargaining solution is
P1 = $8.28/Kg, P2 = $4.25/Kg, Q1 = 038, Q2 = 0.55, yl = 1, 2 = 0.23.
RNP = $1340 x 106, RNC $422 x 106
The world price for cobalt is set at $8.28/Kg and the output share
of ocean mining is decided at 1. The royalty on technology is fixed at
$3.15/Kg of cobalt.
The world of nickel is set at $4.25/Kg and the output share of ocean
mining is fixed at 0.23 of the net world demand. The royalty on techno-
logy is fixed at $2.34/Kg of mined nickel.
In this case the Enterprise can either produce the cobalt and nickel
from the deep oceanbed, paying the mining firms a total technological roy-
alty of $422 x 106 or the mining consortia can produce directly, turn over
the cobalt and nickel to the Enterprise charging a fee for its technology
(which includes management). In either event, the rents of production from
offshore mines are almost entirely appropriated by the royalty on technology
so that the bulk of the rents for the NP, $1340 x 106, derive from the on-
shore production of nickel. The NP for cobalt phase out all land-based
production and they are implicitly compensated for loss of rent through
the price of nickel as described under Scenario 1.
(iii) Cobalt, Nickel and Copper
The objective function of the NP and NC is the combination of the
objective functions of actors in the cobalt, nickel and copper markets.
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RNp = (P1-4.3)(1-yl)A1-1'7 + (Pl(l-Ql)-5.1)y 1AP 1 7
+ (P2-1.6)(1-y 2)A2P 1 +1.72-.)(1-Y2)A2P + (P2(l-Q2)-l.9)y 2A 2P217
+ (P3-1.1)(1.-y3)A3P 31.48 + (P 3(1-Q3)-.5)3A3P31 48
Rop = $1744.3 x 06
:Q A-0. 
-0.7 
-0.48RNC = Q 1A1P 0 + Q2Y2A2P20'7 + Q3 3A3P3
RC = 0
7A1P-1.7 6A p -1.7
° Y I' 1$ Y2 A p -1.7 Y1; 3 A -1.48
A2P 2 A 3 P3
0 - < 1 5.1 0 < Q3 1 - ; 0 < 1P1 <2 
Y2
1.5
P3
Max R = (RNp - R Np) (R C RC)
P' P2 P3 Q1' Q2' Q3 Y '
The bargaining solution is
P1 = $5.40/Kg,
Q1 0.06,
Y1 = 1.00,
RNp= $3630 x 106
NP 11~~~~~~~~~
P2 = $4.85/Kg,
Q2 = 0.61,
Y2 = 0.59,
P3 = $3.75/Kg
Q3= 0.60
Y3 = 0.19
R $1530 x 106 .NC
The world price of cobalt is set at $5.40/Kg and the entire net demand
market is satisfied by production from offshore mines. The royalty on tech-
nology is fixed at $0.32/Kg. The world price for nickel is set at $4.85/Kg
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and 0.59 of the world net demand is satisfied by offshore production. The
royalty on technology is decided at $2.96/Kg. The world price for copper
is set at $3.75/Kg and 0.19 of the world net demand is satisfied from off-
shore production. The royalty on technology for copper is fixed at $2.25/Kg.
The NC through the mining consortia derive their rents from royalty on
technology which appropriates most of the rents from offshore production.
While the NP keep control over the sales of the three minerals, they essen-
tially derive rents only from the onshore production of nickel and copper,
since the onshore production of cobalt is phased out. The NP for cobalt
are assumed, as before, to be compensated for the loss of rent through the
prices of copper and nickel.
The solution implies that about 8 mines will be operated to satisfy
the net demand if the Enterprise produces by itself. If the Enterprise
purchases the technology from the consortia it will produce copper and
nickel for itself, but cobalt for the NC, who will have to reimburse the
Enterprise for the costs of production. Conversely, the mining consortia
could produce operating 2 mines each (consequently 10 mines in all would
be needed), keeping the cobalt and turning over the copper and nickel to
the Enterprise after being compensated for production costs and a techno-
logy fee.
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SCENARIO 3: BOTH THE NP AND NC PRODUCE; TRANSFER PAYMENTS
In this scenario, the institutional aspects modeled in Scenarios 1 and
2 are combined and extended. The NP produce from offshore mines through the
Enterprise and the NC produce as well through ocean mining consortia. The
NP or the Enterprise buy the technology needed for deep seabed mining from
the mining consortia who in turn pay a production royalty on oceanbed pro-
duction.
The model is consistent with many of the institutional arrangements
that have been proposed at UNCLOS III. The mining consortia are permitted
to derive rents from production and technology while the Enterprise derives
rents from production as well as from being a renter that extracts a royalty
on every unit of deep seabed minerals harvested by the consortia.
The policy variables are the world price, P, the output share of ocean-
bed production, y, the offshore production of the NP, , the royalty on tech-
nology Q and the royalty on production Z. The upper bound on the royalties
is the point at which the rents of the user are driven to zero. This estab-
lishes the limit value of technology and production royalty.
The process constraints on oceanbed production are introduced explicitly.
Cobalt is first modeled by itself and then, as earlier, nickel and copper are
added. The purpose of this scenario is to model aspects of the UNCLOS III,
to investigate the distribution of rents under such an institutional arrange-
ment, to investigate the outcome of various policy variables and to track the
consequences of linking cobalt, nickel and copper in a joint commodity agree-
ment where transfer payments to actors in the 3 mineral markets are implicitly
incorporated in the solutions to the policy variables, especially the prices
and market shares.
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(i) Cobalt
The rents to the NP are the rents from onshore and oceanbed pro-
duction plus the royalty on NC production less the royalty on technology.
The rents to the NC are the rents of production plus the rents on techno-
logy sold to the NP less the royalty on production.
-1 7RNp = (P1-4.3)(1-yl)A1P1 + (Pl(1-Q1)-5.1)yll 1A 1P 1'7 + lZ1(1-e1)AP1P ' 7
R~p = $39.2 x 106
RNC (Pl(l-Z1)-5.l)(l- 1 ) lA1P P + QllYA1Pl 7
RNC = 0
5.1O<0 1 Y1 < 1; 0<Z1 , Q <1 -P.
Max R = (RN p - ROp) (RNC RNC)
P1 'Y 1'Z 1' Q1eNl
The bargaining outcome is
P1 = $11.7/Kg, Q1 = 0.564, Z = 0.56, e1 = 0.54, y1 = 0.48.
RNp = $81.99 x 106, RNC = $20.57 x 106
The world price is set at $11.7/Kg, the royalty on technology at 56.4%
of the price and the royalty on production at 56% of the price. The output
share of ocean minerals is 48% of the net demand market and of this output
share, 54% is allocated to the Enterprise or the NP. The net demand market
share of the NC or the mining consortia is 0.22.
Of the total rents of about $82 x 106 accruing to the NP, $17.2 x 106
are from the royalties on oceanbed production. Of the rents accruing to the
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NC, $20.4 x 106 are from the technology royalty. This implies that most of
the rents to NC are in the form of technological rents because after paying
a production royalty to the NP, the effective price the NC are able to rea-
lize is $5.15/Kg which is almost their marginal cost of production. The
effective price for oceanbed production the NP are able to realize in turn
after paying the rent on technology is $5.10 which is equal to the marginal
cost of production.
(ii) Cobalt and Nickel
RNp = (Pl-4.3)(1-l1)A1P7 + (Pl(l-Ql)-5.1)yle1 A1P 1 7
+ 1Zl(l- 1 )A1P1 7 + 1.6)( )A 17 + (P2(1-Q2)-l.9)
Y22A2P 2 + Y2Z2 (1-e2)A 2P 2 7
ROp = $814 x 10 6
RNC = (Pl(l-Z1)-5.l)(1-e1)y1A1Pll 7 + QolelY1A1P 0 7 + (P2(1-Z2)-.9)
-1 7 -0.7
(1-02)Y2A 2P2 + Q202y 2A2P 2
RC = $0
5.]0 < e0102 1 < 1; 0 < Q1 < 1 - 51
-1.7
1.9 7A1 '
-Z2' Q2 < 1 P 2 ; 2 12 A2P 2
Max R =(RN - R) (RN - RC
P1 P2'Y1 Q1 Q2 Z1 Z2 81e2'
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-The bargaining solution is
P1 = $8.27/Kg, P2 = $4.25/Kg, Q1 = 0.38, Q2 0.55
1 = l,y2 = 0.23, Z1 = 0, Z2 = , 01 = 0, 02 =.
RNp = $1340 x 106, RNC = $423 x 10
The world price for cobalt is set at $8.27/Kg and the output share of
deep ocean mining is equal to the entire net demand market, all of which is
allocated to the mining consortia. No production royalty is paid for ex-
tracting cobalt and since the Enterprise does not produce any cobalt from
offshore mines no technology royalty is paid although it is set at $3.14/Kg.
The world price for nickel is set at $4.25 and the output share of ocean
mining is fixed at 0.23 of the net world demand. All offshore production is
allocated to the mining consortia. The NP for nickel retain 0.77 of the net
demand market. There is no royalty on production and since the Enterprise
engages in no mining, no royalty on technology is paid even though it is set
at $2.34/Kg.
The NC, through the consortia, earn rents of $423 x 106 while the NP for
nickel earn rents of $1340 x 106. The NP for cobalt earn no rents. The im-
plicit transfer payments discussed under Scenario 1 are presented too [?]
It may be recalled that many of the NP for cobalt are also NP for nickel, so
that transfer payments can take place through the price of nickel, which is
presumably set at a level that compensates for the loss of rents from onshore
cobalt production. Moreover, the only NP for cobalt that has neither a nickel
nor a copper operation will cease to be a producer of any significance by 1985,
so that its case for explicit transfer payments may be a very tenuous one.
In contrast with the analysis for cobalt alone it is noticed that while
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the NP has 0.78 of the market, here they have none. While transfer pay-
ments on both technology and production took place in that case, none are
made here, and while the price of cobalt was set at $11.7/Kg in the ear-
lier case, it is set t $8.27/Kg, which is lower than 1976 real prices,
here. The consumers -'or cobalt gain as do the mining consortia. On-
shore production of c oalt is phased out.
Finally, it is s en that the total rents to the NP and NC are almost
identical under both cenarios 1 and 2, as is the allocation of output
shares to ocean mining and the world prices for cobalt and nickel. The
difference, of course, is that in Scenario 1 the mining consortia produce
on behalf of the Enterprise which pays them a rent on technology while in
Scenario 2 the mining firms produce for themselves and do not, obviously,
collect rents on technology from the Enterprise whose role clearly is much
reduced. At best it becomes a focus for negotiating between the NP and
the NC.
(iii) Cobalt, Nickel and Copper
RNp = (P1-4.3)(1-l)A 1P 1 7 + (Pl(l-Q1)-5.l)YlO1 AlP 1 7
-0 7 -1.7
+ y1Z1(l-e1 )A1PlO 1 + (P2-1.6)(l-y 2)A2P21
+ (P2(l-Q2)-l1 9)y202A2P2 + 2Z2(l-02)A2P 2
+ (P3-1.1)(1- y3)A3P 31 48 + (P3(l-Q3 )-1 .)5) y303 A3P 3
+ 3Z 3(l- 3)A3P 3 4
R =p $1744.3 x 106
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RNC = (Pl(1-Z 1)-5.1)(l-l)Y 1A 1Pl1'7 + QlOlYAP07
+ (P 2(1-z2 )-l.9)(1-O 2)yA2P + Q222A2 20'48
+ (P3(1-Z3)-1.5)(1-03 )y3A 3P 1 48+ Q3 3 3A3P30 48
RNc $0
0 < 2 03 1 <1 ; 0<1 Z, 1 5.1
- 2' ' -1 ;- < ' - P1
1.9 1.52'P < Z3, Q 3 < -2 P, ; 0<2 3
7AP-1.7 6AP 1 -1.77A1 P1 6A1P1
2 - -1.7 1 3 ; 3 -1 48 1
A2P2 A3P3
Max R = (Ro - R~) (RNC RC)) (RN - R NC
P1 'P2'P3 'Q1 'Q2'Q3 'Z1 'Z2'Z 31' 1 '0 2, 0 3,Y 1
The bargaining solution is
P1 = $5.41/Kg, P2 = $4.85/Kg, P3 = $3.76/Kg
Q = 0.06
z1 = 
Z1 = 0
Q2 = 0.61
Y2= 0
2= 0
2= 1
RNp = $3630 x 106
Q3 = 0.60
Y3 =0.19
z3= 0
e3 :0e3:
RNC = $1530 x 106
The world price for cobalt is set at $5.41/Kg and all the net demand
is satisfied by offshore production. The mining consortia are allocated
r"
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the entire share of oceanbed production. No production royalty is paid
and, if applicable, the royalty on technology would be $0.32/Kg of cobalt
mined.
The world price for nickel is set at $4.85/Kg and 0.59 of the net
world demand is satisfied by offshore production. The entire offshore
production is allocated to the NP or the Enterprise acting on their be-
half. There is no royalty on production but the royalty on technology
is $2.96/Kg of nickel mined from the deep seabed. The world price of
copper is set at $3.76/Kg and 0.19 of the world net demand is satisfied
by offshore production, all of which is allocated to the mining consortia.
Again, there is no royalty on offshore production and the royalty on tech-
nology, if applicable, would be $2.26/Kg.
The rents to the NC are $1530 x 106 and to the NP are $3630 x 106.
It may be noted that all rents the NP ealize from offshore production
are essentially captured by the royalties on technology. In effect, the
NP realize rents from onshore production of nickel and copper only. To
the extent that they are able to maintain a substantial market share in
the copper market and the entire share of the net nickel market, they may
be able to keep control over the markets and derive utility from this.
The NC earn rents from production as well as royalties on technology.
The royalty is from technology in account for about $917 x 106 out of a
total rent of $1530 x 106.
Once again, the NP for cobalt lose their rents entirely, but again,
it is supposed they are compensated for this loss by the implicit trans-
fer payments reflected in the prices and market shares for copper and
nickel.
Operationally, the results of the game model for this case can be
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interpreted in two ways. Since it would not be practical for the con-
sortia to mine only cobalt and copper and for the Enterprise to mine only
nickel, either one or the other will have to mine all three minerals (this
is optimal in terms of marginal costs since the ferromanganese deposits
are a joint product resource) and then make physical transfers in exchange
for rents or royalties.
In one arrangement the mining consortia could produce the cobalt,
nickel and copper and then transfer the nickel to the Enterprise, char-
ging it a royalty on technology and mining expenses. In the other arrange-
ment, the Enterprise could buy the mining technology from the consortia,
produce from the deep seabed, keep the nickel and transfer the copper and
cobalt to the NC. This, however, is not as practical as the first arrange-
ment, since the consortia could quite easily produce on their own because
they already possess the technology.
The addition of copper to the model changes the earlier outcomes for
cobalt and nickel. The price of the former is driven from $8.27/Kg (see
Scenario 1.3 (ii) ) to $5.41/Kg. The price of the latter, on the contrary
is driven up from $4.25/Kg to $4.86/Kg and its output share of offshore
production goes from 0.23 to 0.59 of the net worth demand market. More-
over, the entire oceanbed production is allocated to the NP in this case,
whereas earlier it went to the NC.
(iv) Cobalt, Nickel and Copper with Constrained Copper Prices
The earlier formulation is slightly modified here by constraining
the upper limit of the price of copper to $2.50/Kg. This is an attempt
to investigate how the bargained solution would change if there were an
international commodity agreement on copper that kept its price between
established limits. While the figure of $2.50/Kg was chosen somewhat
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arbitrarily, it does reflect the historical high reached by copper
prices in the past decade. To that extent, it may provide the basis
for an agreed upper price limit incorporated in a producer-consumer
association modeled alter the Internation Tin Agreement. Copper has
been designated an UNCTAD "core" commodity and some agreement on sta-
bilizing may not be f r in the future.
The bargaining o tcome of this case is shown in Table 4.2 and com-
pared with the uncons rained case. While the price of copper attains
the upper limit of $2.50/Kg, the price of cobalt declines to $5.3/Kg
from $5.41/Kg, the price of nickel rises sharply to $5.44/Kg from
$4.85/Kg. Total rents to the NP fall slightly to $3550 x 106 from
$3630 x 106, while those accruing to the NC fall somewhat as well, from
$1530 x 106 to $1420 x 106. In percentages, however, these declines are
small. The fall in the price of copper is clearly compensated for by
the rise in the price of nickel. As a group, the NP and NC try to pro-
tect total rents by negotiating on the prices of all three minerals
simultaneously, so that in a joint commodity agreement if price limits
are imposed on one commodity, the prices of others are influenced as
well. Indeed, the impact of a price limit extends to other variables
as well. The output shares of ocean minerals rises to 0.74 from 0.59
for nickel but falls from 0.19 to 0.11 for copper. It is unchanged
for cobalt.
The biggest change, however, is in market shares. The share of
deep seabed output for copper is allocated entirely to the NP or the
Enterprise which is the complete opposite of the unconstrained case.
Moreover, the net demand share of the NP for nickel goes to 1.0 from 0
and for copper it goes to 1.0 from 0.81. As a consequence, the compo-
sition of rents to the NC or the mining consortia changes. They now
-91-
TABLE 4.2
Comparison of 2 Versions of Scenario 3
Model
Outcome
RNp
RNC
P1
P2
P3
D1
D2
D3
Yl
Y2
Y3
O1
e2
z3
Q,
Q2
Q3
Z1
Z2
Z3
Number of
offshore mines
Market-Shares
of NP for
Cobalt
Nickel
Copper
Copper Prices
Unconstrained
$3630 x 106
$1530 x 106
$5.41/Kg
$4.85/Kg
$3.76/Kg
44.3 x 106Kg
525.0 x 106Kg
1370.0 x 106Kg
1.00
0.59
0.19
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.06
0.61
0.60
0.00
0.00
0.00
10
0.00
0.00
0.81
Copper Prices Constrained to an
Upper Limit of $2.50/Kg
........ ~ ,~ ~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
$3550 x 106
$1420 x 106
$5.30/Kg
$5.44/Kg
$2.50/Kg
45.9 x 106Kg
432.0 x 10Kg
2500.0 x 106Kg
1.00
0.74
0.11
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.04
0.65
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
10
0.00
1.00
1.00 I
I
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derive the bulk of their rent from royalties on technology used to pro-
duce nickel and copper from the deep seabed.
Operationally, too, the results could be interpreted as having
changed from the uncontstrained case. Since the entire production share
for copper and nickel from offshore mines now goes to the NP, the Enter-
prise could engage in mining after buying the technology from the mining
consortia. The Enter rise would discover, however, that while it has com-
plete control over th sales of nickel and copper, its rents from offshore
production are almost completely appropriated by the royalties paid for
the technology.
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of this chapter are summarized in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
Table 4.3 presents a comparison of the preferred model across scenarios
moving from cobalt to cobalt and nickel, and finally to cobalt, nickel
and copper. Table 4.4 presents a comparison of offshore production and
NP market shares for the 3 scenarios with cobalt, nickel and copper con-
sidered together. The implications of these results and the analysis
contained in this chapter are ennumerated below.
1. Negotiated Outcomes
A negotiated outcome over the division of rents, the establishment
of prices and allocation of market shares dominates a non-negotiated
outcome except in those cases where consumer surplus is explicitly
considered. Even here a negotiated outcome may be preferable be-
cause there could be sound political reasons for sacrificing some
consumer surplus. Indeed, it is the revealed preference of offi-
cial negotiators from the U.S., Western Europe and Japan to trade
consumer surplus versus non-economic gains such as stability in
commodity markets, enhanced national security through reduced
global tension and access to secure sources of supply. Further,
the practical policy decisions pertaining to the New Economic Or-
der and a desire to secure greater international egalitarianism
require that some consumer surplus be translated to the NP from
the South through higher prices for some minerals. Producer units
from the NC also benefit by this agreement. Here again, it may be
noted that the revealed preference of U.S. negotiators at the UNCLOS
*The Economist of London has kept an especially keen eye on developments.
See for instance the report "Commodities Fund," March 25, 1978, pp.91-92.
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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III is in favor of securing terms acceptable to international
mining consortia based largely in the U.S. and dominated by U.S.
firms. In the arena of domestic policy as well, the bias is
clearly in favor of the producers since the various bills be-
fore Congress that relate to oceanbed mining all draw their in-
spiration from a measure originally drafted by the U.S Mining
Congress.
*(footnote continued from previous page) The U.S. primarily views com-
modity agreements as a way of responding to the constraints of interde-
pendence (as the cost, merely, of consumer surplus in that particular
market) and as a forum for bargaining between the NP and NC. The U.S.
Secretary of the Interior has observed that "Current U.S. interest in
international commodity policy is partly the result of increasing pres-
sure from developing countries for special international agreements to
regulate commodity prices" and noted that "Producer organizations in
many industries are becoming councils where producers and consumers can
carry out specific negotiations," Mining and Minerals Policy 1977, Annual
Report of the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: January 1977),
p. 146.
In Western Europe the tendency of the EEC to sacrifice consumer sur-
plus through the formation of European cartels is too well known to re-
quire elaboration here. The most recent attempts at helping producers
of steel, synthetic fibers and petrochemicals is through the formation of
an EEC Industry Commissioner. For a disapproving comment on this refer
to "Davignon's dangerous path," The Economist, April 22, 1978, pp. 88-89.
For yet another example of producer rents being protected at the expense
of consumer surplus, note the recent talks among officials from the U.S.,
Japan and the EEC on formulating a world steel agreement. A report of
the meeting is provided in "Towards a World Steel Cartel," The Economist,
April 29, 1978, p. 95.
** For an analysis of these bills see Kildow, Judith T. and Vinod K. Dar,
"U.S. Policies and the Ocean Mining Industry," in Law of the Sea: Con-
ference Outcomes and Problems of Implementation, ed. Edward Miles and
John King Gamble, Jr., Ballinger Publishing Company (Cambridge, MA, 1976)
and Nyhart et al., op cit. While the bills have gradually moved from a
'nationalistic' to an 'internationalistic' posture there has been no-move-
ment away from protecting the interests of the mining consortia. Con-
sumer surplus is not an issue. See also John Breaux, "A Congressional
Perspective on Deep Ocean Mining," in Undersea Mineral Resources, Set
No. 12, American Mining Congress, 1978. J.D. Nyhart et al., A Cost Model
of Deep Ocean Mining and Associated Regulatory Issues, M.I.T. Sea Grant
Program, Report Number MITSG 78-6, March 1978.
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2. Linking Markets
The impact of linking the international commodity markets for
cobalt, .nickel and copper in a joint bargaining game is a con-
vergence in their prices. The price of cobalt falls as its mar-
ket is linked first with nickel and then with nickel and copper.
The price of nictel rises as its market is linked with the other
two minerals and the price of copper rises significantly because
of the linkage.
The NP and NC Are interested in maximizing total rents rather than
rents in any particular market. The cobalt market being small in terms
of rents can be bargained away to the NC in return for higher rents in
the more significant nickel market and the considerably more important
copper market. Consequently, the NC attain control over cobalt produc-
tion, which shifts to the oceanbed as the mines of the NP are either
phased out or as cobalt is no longer extracted as a by-product of copper
or nickel. Once cobalt is produced from offshore mines, with their much
larger reserve base (as compared to onshore mines), the price promptly
falls to near marginal cost since both the NP and the NC find it more
profitable to concentrate on the prices of copper and nickel.
In the case of nickel, prices rise somewhat above the relatively
low 1975 levels'reflecting the exertion of market power. This is quite
feasible since the NP and NC must function like a two-part cartel if
they are to reach a negotiated solution that is pareto-optimal. How-
ever, prices of nickel cannot really rise much above their (real) his-
torical levels because, until recently, nickel prices were close to the
monopoly point for INCO, long the world's dominant and lowest cost pro-
ducer.
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The price of copper rises most significantly above 1975 levels be-
cause it is the market that provides the greatest opportunity for in-
creases in rent. The 1975 price for copper was unusually depressed
and the market is cert;ainly the most competitive of the three. Car-
telization, therefore, affords the incentive and the opportunity for
exercising unutilized market power and this is reflected in the almost
doubling of the price of copper, from levels close to the marginal costs
of production.
3. Level of Rents
The level of total rents remains quite stable across scenarios even
though the composition changes. This suggests that the different insti-
tutional approaches modeled in the scenarios are essentially distribu-
tional in their impact. The model outcomes are different aspects of the
same economic game, which ultimately is a function of marginal costs,
prices and net demand shares. The different institutional arrangements
do not, therefore, change the total rents available for distribution,
but rather the components of these rents. This, incidentally, serves to
validate the internal consistency of the game model.
4. Rents to Technology
Much of the rent from offshore production is appropriated by the
proprietary technology of the mining consortia. It is not surprising
that in the case of deep oceanbed mining all surplus, i.e. the differ-
ence between market price and marginal costs, should be appropriated by
the owners of technology rather than land, since significant advances
in technology are necessary for successful offshore mining. Land-based
mining technology, on the other hand, is well tested and widely dispersed
so that it can hardly command much rent. In theory, therefore, it becomes
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immaterial whether the mining consortia produce themselves or license
their technology to the Enterprise which produces on its own, because
the rental component of price in either case is the royalty on techno-
logy.
5. Pricing Strategies
The solutions to the game model suggest pricing strategies for the
NP for cobalt, nickel and copper. The NP for cobalt, perceiving their
total loss of market share by 1985-1990, might follow a strategy of
short-term rent maximization by gradually raising the price of cobalt
in 1975 dollars until they reach the point of short-run profit maximi-
zation. New land-based producers will have little incentive to make
the capital investments necessary to enter the industry, since produc-
tion will be switched to the oceans anyway, and consumers will not find
it worthwhile to invest in technological change and substitutes if cobalt
prices are expected to fall to levels close to the marginal cost of off-
shore production by 1985-1990. The NP for nickel might wish to maintain
fairly stable prices to discourage any further entry since they will rea-
lize higher prices and greater rents by 1985-1990 as a consequence of a
negotiated solution with the NC. To do this, however, they will need to
maintain their bargaining position by keeping the industry concentrated.
The'argument for relatively low, stable prices for the NP for copper is
even stronger, because of the anticipated high prices and rents after a
negotiated solution. A reasonably low price trajectory until 1985-
1990 will be both an effective barrier to entry and result in a greater
share of the market of higher cost producers such as the U.S. Both
these factors will lead to a strengthening of the bargaining power of
the NP and lead to the anticipated high price negotiated outcome.
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6. Economic Bargaining Power
The economic bargaining power of the NP is a function of their
lower marginal costs. However, as the technology to develop S-Resources
improves, the scale of operations increases and the corporations from
the NC gain experience in working in the environment of the deep ocean,
the Antarctic, and space, the difference between the marginal costs of
the NP and the NC will decline. Further, within 20 years or so as land-
based reserves are gradually depleted, the cost of production will increase
hyperbolically, which in turn will erode the difference between marginal
costs. In any event, as far as the S-Resources are concerned, the bar-
gaining power of the NC, as expressed in the game model, will increase.
It is in the long term interests of the NP, therefore, to secure an
international treaty governing the distribution of rent from S-Resources
by coming to some agreement, at the least, on world prices and market-
shares.
It might be argued that a competitive solution, as opposed to a
de facto two-part cartel is the best promoter of global welfare and re-
source allocation. This, however, would not be politically feasible.
The dissipation of oligopoly or monopoly rent would hardly be tolerated
by the nations of the South, who view increasing their economic rent
from resource development as part of a general strategy of global re-
distribution.of income. Given the current international political pen-
chant for orderly marketing agreements, producer groups and producer
and consumer agreements (as typified by the UNCTAD core commodity nego-
tiations) a two-part cartel recommends itself as an action based on poli-
tical economy, if not on the pure economics of smoothly adjusting com-
petitive markets.
Much of the technology required to develop S-Resources is the pre-
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serve of corporations based in the U.S., Japan and W. Germany. If
there is no agreement or if the NP pursue a policy of economic con-
frontation, then the development of S-Resources will certainly be
delayed, but equally, it will not be forever prevented, since the NC
will have a long term incentive to ignore the emerging concept of the
'common heritage of mankind' and pursue a unilateral and self-serving
economic policy towards the deep oceanbed, the Antarctic and space.
Whether the NC and especially the U.S., Japan and W. Germany have the
political will to forge a new imperial order needed to do this is a
subject rife with speculation and predictions are fraught with uncer-
tainty. The constraints of interdependence and international egali-
tarianism determine the relative political bargaining power of the NP
and the NC. In the near future the NP may have a growing bargaining
advantage, but in another 20 years, the perceptions of the NC may change
as the rents to be derived from the unilateral exploitation (failing an
international treaty) of S-Resources become increasingly attractive.
If resources scarcities and the persistent threat of economic confron-
tation begin to irk the citizens of the advanced industrialized nations,
then the desire to secure international egalitarianism may decrease and
if that happens, the NP may find their political bargaining power eroding
rapidly.
Finally, there is the matter of structural changes within the NP
and its consequences for the bargaining power of that group. In the
case of cobalt, Zaire is, at present, the undisputed price setter. In
a few years, however, this situation may change as lateritic depo-
sits yielding nickel and cobalt as co-products are developed in New
Caledonia. The NP will have to expand their membership. If the mar-
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ginal costs of producing in New Caledonia are comparable to those of
ocean mining, Zaire may be able to discipline the new member with threats
of price cutting. If, however, the marginal costs are closer to those of
Zaire, then the latter's price setting position may be jeopardized.
In the case of copper, the position is somewhat different. There
may be a tendency for the bargaining power of the NP to increase in the
short run, if Chile, which is probably the lowest marginal cost producer,
can expand output rapidly enough to increase its market share. U.S. pro-
ducers have expressed some alarm at Chile's plans after noting that Chi-
lean production in 1977 was 6% more than in 1976, and in 1976 it in-
creased production by 21% over the 1975 levels. The marginal cost of
production in the U.S. is over $1/Kg for new mines, whereas in Chile it
could be about 60¢/Kg or less. The cost of transportation from Chile to
the U.S. or Western Europe is about 6¢/Kg, so that Chilean copper has a
considerable competitive advantage. Indeed, in January 1978, Chile was
making one year contracts with U.S. customers at the London Metals Ex-
change price of $1.25/Kg, as opposed to the U.S. producers' price of
$1.39/Kg (etz, 1978).
The world nickel market, too, is changing. For many years, it, like
the cobalt market, had been characterized by a monopolistic producer and
a price taking fringe. The monopolist, INCO Ltd. (of Canada) had vir-
tually developed the industry and the markets and its price setting role
was undisputed. That role, however, has been seriously challenged in re-
cent years and in 1977 INCO suspended its policy of posting prices, thus
providing an umbrella for other producers, and declared it would enter
into price competition by letting prices fluctuate according to market
conditions. This was merely a reflection of decaying market power. In
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1950, the firm had accounted for 90% of the non-communist market. By
1970 its share was reduced to 50% of a considerably bigger market.
INCO's comparative advantage of control over high grade ores in Ontario,
Canada was gradually negated by technological developments that made
possible the profitable production of nickel from lateritic ores com-
mon in the nations of the South. Supply pressure at present comes from
such nations as New Caledonia, Indonesia and Guatemala. Indeed, over-
capacity and rapidly increasing supplies in the world nickel market
have forced INCO, Societe Metallurgique Le Nickel (owned jointly by
Societe Imetal and Societe National Elf Aquitaine) and Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Ltd. of Canada, among other producers, to institute cut-
backs in production in an effort to restore nickel prices. In such an
environment, the bargaining power of the NP versus the NC is certain to
decay.
While the NC will try to further reduce their dependence on the NP
by extracting nickel from the seabed, the NP may be expected to try to
acquire some control over that potentially troublesome new source of
supply. INCO, in an attempt to control both land-based and offshore
supplies, has formed a mining consortium to develop ferromanganese no-
dules. In this regard it is merely acting like a well-behaved monopo-
list. Its strategy seems to be to try and position itself in the camps
of both the NP as an onshore producer, and the NC as one of a group of
firms that will operate out of the U.S. and engage in offshore mining,
so that whatever rents it loses from onshore production it could make
up by rents from technology or both, from offshore production.
Trends in the non-communist producer concentration of the three
minerals are shown in Table 5. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of con-
centration has been computed for 1965, 1970 and 1975. The decline of
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INCO is evident from the falling index for nickel. The index for cobalt
shows mainly the relative changes in Zaire's pre-eminence and continues
to be high. The falling index for copper is testimony to increasing
global competition and the relative decline of the U.S. and Canada as
members of CIPEC increase output.
TABLE 4.5
Herfindahl-Hirschma- Index of Non-Communist Producer Concentration
YEAR COBALT NICKEL COPPER
1965 0.349 0.590 0.172
1970 0.492 0.385 0.167
1975 0.394 0.231 0.131
Notes:
(a) The H-H index is the sum of the squares of the market shares.
(b) The communist count-tes are generally a closed system with re-
spect to these minerals.
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APPENDIX 1: DEEP OCEAN MINE SITES
It has been suggested for engineering and economic reasons that a
mine site be defined as an area capable of yielding 3 million dry metric
tons of nodules per year for 20 years (Pasho and McIntosh, 1976), i.e. an
area of the deep ocear'bed that has recoverable reserves of 60 million dry
metric tons of nodule . Moreover, the nodules must have a minimum average
grade quality of 2.27' nickel and copper (Kildow et al., 1976). Finally,
the sea floor topograp hy, ocean currents and weather conditions must be
such that mining is physically possible. These three conditions, abundance,
grade quality and physical environment, define a mine site.
An area of the oceanbed where the minimum grade quality is satisfied is
termed 'prime.' An analysis using the SIO Sediment Data Bank at the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography reveals that most of the prime area is in the
northeast equatorial Pacific region (Frazer, 1977), and covers 1.37 million
square kilometers. The nodule abundance in areas with a sufficient concen-
tration to mine (greater than 5 Kg/m2 -- Kaufman, 1974) is 11 Kg/m2.
Even after a mine site has been selected to obtain the optimal sea floor
topography, it is estimated that 20% of the mine site will be inaccessible
owing to the presence of obstructions (Kaufman, 1974). The mining dredge
head will have an estimated efficiency of 60% and the mining sweep efficiency
will be about 65% (Kaufman, 1974). This leads to a recovery efficiency of 20%.
Since a mine site must yield 60 million tons of dry nodules and wet no-
dules contain about 30% water, this requires 86 million wet tonnes of re-
coverable nodules per site. Since the recovery efficiency is 20%, a mine
site must have a required abundance of 430 million tonnes. A square meter
of the mine site contains 11 Kg of nodules so that the area of a mine site
must be 3.9 x 104 square kilometers.
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The total prime area has been estimated at 1.37 x 106 square kilo-
meters, which suggests that there are probably 35 first generation mine
sites. With more sophisticated technology or a higher price for the ore,
the number of mine sites could increase substantially. There is, however,
no estimate of the price elasticity of recoverable reserves.
The value of 1 tonne of mineable manganese nodules (when only cobalt,
nickel and copper are extracted) from a representative mine site is about
$101, on the basis of 1976 prices, as shown in Table 1. Ocean mining re-
coverable reserves and land-based reserves are presented in Table 2. World
production of manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper for 1975 and 1976 is
shown in Table 3.
TABLE 1
Value of 3 Minerals in 1 Metric Ton
of a Representative Sample of Manganese Nodules
1 Source: Hans M. Amann, "Definition of an Ocean Mining Site," paper no. OTC
2238, Figure 7, Offshore Technology Conference, Dallas, Texas, 1975.
Computed from: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Commodity Data Summaries, 1977.
* This number, however, is tentative. It has been pointed out by Dr. Jane
Frazer of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography that the reliability of
available data concerning the grade and abundance of seabed manganese no-
dules is not of a nature that permits confident predictions (Frazer, 1977).
In a Mine Site
% of 19762 Value/MT
Metal 1 Dry Ton World Price $
$/MT
Ni 1.3 5.06 x 103 65.78
Cu 1.1 1.606 x 103 15.66
Co 0.2 9.79 x 103 19.58
$101.02
.
.
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TABLE 2
Ocean Mineral Recoverable Resources Per Mine Site,
Total First Generation
Ocean Mining Recoverable Reserves and Land-Based Proven Reserves
(Million Metric Ton)
Metal Reserves/Si .e Total Ocean Land1
Reserves Base Reserves
Mn 15.36 537.6 5654.50
Ni 0.78 27.3 55.45
Cu 0.66 23.1 460.00
Co 0.12 4.2 1.65
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Commodity Data Summaries, 1977. Reserves in
each case refer to ores commercially recoverable by present technology and
should be viewed as the most conservative estimate of available metals. Does
not include lateritic ores.
TABLE 3
World Stocks, Flow, Stock to Flow Ratio and Years to Depletion of
4 Metals (Millions of Tonnes)
Metal World Reserves Production (P) Stock/Flow Years to
1975 1976 (R/P) Depletion
............. -_________ Ratio 1976 (YTD)**
Manganese 5992.10 24.45 24.63 243.3 70.6
Nickel 82.75 0.818 0.800 103.4 46.8
Copper 483.10 6.98 7.39 65.4 36.8
Cobalt 5.85 0.033 0.035 167.14 59.7
* Not including lateritic ores.
** YTD = log [(R/P)( p) + 1] - 1
log (DP + 1)
P
DP = 3% (assumed annual growth rate of production)
P
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APPENDIX 2: DYNAMIC FORMULATION OF THE GAME MODEL
While the static model presented in Chapter 4 captures the essential
features of the game, a dynamic model may lead to greater insights because:
(1) The NP and N may have different discount rates, and,
(2) The threat print may vary over time owing to (a) hyperbolic mar-
ginal costs aused by resource depletion and (b) changing limit
prices owing to stochastic pricing pursued by the NP as an opti-
mal strategy to prevent mining by the NC or owing to stock adjust-
ment effects in the supply of scrap.
Different discount rates and hyperbolic marginal costs are modeled ex-
plicitly in a dynamic version of Scenario 1 that follows. It is not solved
owing to the computational complexity of optimal control problems. Even the
simple structure of Scenario 1 becomes rather unwieldy in the dynamic version.
Scenarios 2 and 3 would result in computationally intractable dynamic games
and hence were not modeled. A future effort may, however, attempt a solu-
tion to the problem.
N 1
RNP N 1 WP1 1.7
RNP t 1 l+1t [ (lt FPlt ) lt A 1(+)P  t
WP2
+ (P2t FP2t ) B2tA2(1+92) P2t
WP
3 t -1.48
+ (P3t FP3t ) B3tA3(l+g3) P3t] (1)
Time varying limit prices are discussed in detail by David M.G. Newberry,
who points out that a "monopolists optimal limit pricing strategy may in-
volve randomizing prices even though stable prices would be feasible," in
"Stochastic Limit Pricing," The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1,
Spring 1978.
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1
(l+6 )t
WS1
( FSlt
WP1
FPl )A1(l+gl lt
WP2 t 1.7
FP2t A2(1+ 2) p2t
S 3 P3t 48
+ W(FS3t iP3t)A3(+g 3)P3t -1. 48
Al(l+gl)tlt
-17
A2(l+g2)tP2 I-17
A(l +g1)tP -17
A1(1+g1 )tpl17
A3(+g 3)tP3 148
(1-Bit)
(1-Bit)
FPt = FP BltA (1+gi t ` 1,t-1 - it (6)1 )tPlt .7
FSt = FS1 ,t- - (1-Blt)Al (1+gl)tPlt
= FP2 t- - BF2,t_1 - 2tA2(l+g 2 P2t-
FS2t = FS2,tl - (1-B2t)A 2(1+92) P2t-
FF
= FS
3,t-1 B3tA3 (1+93) t P3t
.7 (7)
(8)
(9)
-1.48
3,t-1 - (1-B3t)A3(1+g3) P3t
-1 .48
Max R = (RNp - Rop) (RNC
N
RO = NP t=l
WS2
+ (FS2t2t
RoRNC
B2t
B3t
= 0
=1-
= 1 -
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
FP2t
FP3t
FS3t
(10)
(11)I
(12)
- R )
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where:
WP = constant related to the marginal cost of land-based production
at t = 0.
WS = constant related to the marginal cost of ocean-based production
at t = 0.
FPt= land-based reserves.
FSt= ocean-based reserves.
61 = discount rate of the NP.
62 = discount rate of the NC.
g = growth rate demand.
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